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THE BATTERED WOMAN AND TORT LAW: A NEW
APPROACH TO FIGHTING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
I long to hear that you have declared an independency--and by the way
in the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to
make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous
and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited
power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be
tyrants if they could. If perticular care and attention is not paid to the
Ladies we are determined to foment a Rebelion, and will not hold our-
selves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representa-
tion. . . . That your Sex are Naturally Tyrannical is a Truth so
thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute, but such ofyou as wish
to be happy willingly give up the harsh title of Master for the more
tender and endearing one of Friend. Why then, not put it out of the
power of the vicious and the Lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity
with impunity. Men of Sense in all Ages abhor those customs which
treat us only as the vassals of your sex. 1
1. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), reprinted in PHYLLIS LEE
LEVIN, ABIGAIL ADAMS 82 (1987). Abigail Adams was married to John Adams, who helped
draft the Declaration of Independence, became the United States' first minister to England and
became the first Vice-President and the second President of the United States. Id. at xi. Abi-
gail's son, John Quincy Adams, became the sixth President of the United States. Id. With her
letter, Abigail began the struggle for women's rights in the United States. Id. at 81. John's
reply reflected the founding fathers' intent that women were not to be equally protected by the
laws of the new nation:
As to your extraordinary Code or Laws, I cannot but laugh. We have been told that
our Struggle has loosened the bands of Government every where. That Children and
Apprentices were disobedient-that schools and Colledges were grown turbulent-
that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes grew insolent to their Masters.
But your Letter was the first Intimation that another Tribe more numerous and pow-
erful than all the rest were grown discontented.-This is rather too coarse a Compli-
ment but you are so saucy, I won't blot it out.
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems.
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), reprinted in LEVIN, supra, at 83.
John apparently was shaken enough to write to a friend and colleague explaining his position
that only men who owned property should have the right to vote. JOAN HOFF, LAW, GEN-
DER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 61 (1990). In his letter he equated
women with children. Id.
But why exclude Women? You will Say, because their Delicacy renders them unfit
for Practice and Experience, in the great Businesses of Life, and the hardy Enter-
prises of War, as well as the arduous Cares of State. Besides, their attention is so
much engaged with the necessary Nurture of their Children, that Nature has made
them fittest for domestic Cares. And Children have not Judgment or Will of their
own.
Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Battery2 is the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States.
3
According to a March of Dimes study, domestic violence is the "leading cause of
birth defects, more than all other medical causes combined."'4 More than two
million women are reported battered every year in the United States.5 This sta-
tistic is believed to be grossly understated. 6 Many women do not report in-
stances of abuse because they are afraid to call the police or seek assistance out
of cultural,7 family' or religious pressure,9 fear of retaliation10 or lack of protec-
tion by the police." Some women do not even identify themselves as being
2. Battery is "[a] harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act in-
tended to cause the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that
such a contact is imminent." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 10, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
3. Karen Tumulty & Stephanie Chavez, Domestic Abuse Laws, Victims Find Little Safety
in System, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1989, at I-1, 1-26. Fifty percent of all women are battered
sometime during their lives. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN at ix (1979).
"Forty-one percent of all women killed are killed by their husbands." WOMEN AND THE LAW
§ 9A.02[l][a], at 9A-4 to -5 (Carol H. Lefcourt ed., 1990).
4. Stan Grossfeld, 'Safer'and in Jail: Women Who Kill Their Batterers, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 2, 1991, at 1, 3.
5. GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CON-
FRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL COURT JUDGES 2 (Nov. 1986).
They have had their teeth knocked out, by fists and by hammer. One woman, beaten
into a coma, was placed on life support for two months, then released to the man
who beat her; another was threatened with having her unborn child cut from her
womb. The women have had cigarettes put out on their necks and objects stuck
inside them until they bled. They have been bound, raped, tortured and forced to
perform sexual acts. Most of them say they felt like killing themselves.
Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 1.
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18290 (West 1991) ("[I]nstances of domestic violence are
considered to be the single most unreported crime in the state."). Dr. Lenore Walker discov-
ered in her research for her book The Battered Woman, WALKER, supra note 3, only ten
percent of the women interviewed ever called the police. Id. at 206.
7. SHEILA JAMES KUEHL ET AL., SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER,
USING THE LAW TO EMPOWER IMMIGRANT WOMEN: INFORMATION & RESOURCES FOR
SERVICE PROVIDERS TO IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN CALIFORNIA ch. 2, at 8 (1990).
8. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 54 (1987); KUEHL et al., supra
note 7, at 8.
9. WALKER, supra note 3, at 23 (Religious advisors tell women to "become better wo-
men, and go home and help their husbands 'become more spiritual and find the Lord.' ").
10. Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspective
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 36 & n.55. Police intervention tends
to be ineffective. WALKER, supra note 3, at 26. The abuse usually resumes with "added vigor"
when the police leave. Id. Consider the case of Lisa Bianco. Ms. Bianco was a battered
woman whose ex-husband was sentenced to five years in prison for his abuse. Tumulty &
Chavez, supra note 3, at 27. Her ex-husband would call her from prison "to tell her what he
planned to do to her when he got out." Id. Even though Ms. Bianco informed prison officials
each time he called, he was released on an eight-hour furlough. During this furlough he went
to Ms. Bianco's home, 150 miles away, and bludgeoned her to death with the butt of a gun.
Id.
11. WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 3, § 9A.02[l][a], at 9A-4.
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battered.12
Battered women 13 often endure physical and psychological abuse over a
long period of time.14 Many battered women seek help at some time from fam-
ily, clergy or the police.15 Nevertheless, these attempts at obtaining help may be
futile and make them feel guilty or ashamed. 1 6 Consequently, battered women
develop certain psychological characteristics making it unlikely they will seek
help in the future. 7
Women who are systematically abused over long periods of time may suffer
from Battered Woman Syndrome, a subcategory of Post-traumatic Stress Disor-
der.18 It has been used to explain why women display these psychological char-
Many people mistakenly believe that the police provide adequate protection for
women who are battered ....
In fact, the law enforcement system fails to protect women from abuse. The
police often fail to respond to domestic disturbance calls. When they do respond,
arrest is unlikely .... [I]n 85 percent of domestic violence cases, the police had been
summoned at least once within the two-year period before the homicide occurred.
The dead person was usually the woman.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see, eg., Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 13.
My husband had just beaten me and I called the police. They came to my driveway
and he's standing at the door and I'm covered in blood and I'm screaming, 'Arrest
him. Y'know, he just beat me.' I wanted him out of my life. I wanted him out of my
house. And they said, 'Well, we didn't see him do it.' People ask why didn't I leave?
I did. Why didn't you go into hiding? I did. I did everything I could, and no one
would help me. If the cops had helped me, maybe he'd be alive today. I didn't want
to kill him. I'm not a killer. It's like he lowered me to his level. It was me or him.
Id.; see also Sheila James Kuehl, 911 Must Bring Protection, Not Just a Post-Mortem, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1989, at 11-7 (woman with restraining order against estranged husband shot
to death by him when police refused to answer her call for help because he had not yet com-
mitted crime). See Patt Morrison, Female Officers Unwelcome-But Doing Well, L.A. TIMES,
July 12, 1991, at Al, for a discussion of police attitudes toward women in the Los Angeles
Police Department. Policemen would send messages over the computer advocating the beat-
ing of women. Id. at A27. Some of the messages relayed over the computer were "'If only I
could slap her I would be happy.'" (sent Jan. 7, 1990); "'Pound her into submission ... and
then have her make you breakfast.'" (sent Jan. 22, 1990); and" 'We got rid of our two lovely
young ladies... They both need a few rounds with the old baton . '. (sent Oct. 8, 1990).
Id. (quoting transcripts reviewed by Christopher Commission).
12. WALKER, supra note 3, at 26.
13. Although domestic violence victims may be male or female, 95% of the victims are
women. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON
CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983). Because of this gender disparity, domestic vio-
lence is considered a "women's issue." This Comment explores the law's treatment of domes-
tic violence and the Battered Woman Syndrome as it affects women's lives.
14. WALKER, supra note 3, at 43.
15. See supra notes 8-9, 11.
16. WALKER, supra note 3, at 23.
17. Id. at 42. Dr. Lenore Walker describes the psychological characteristics as learned
helplessness. Id. An abused woman isolated by her batterer will feel as though she is helpless
and stop trying to escape. See id. at 51-52 (how battered women become victimized).
18. LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 48-49 (1989). Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
is the term coined for the psychological effects suffered from severe and repeated trauma. Id.
at 48. Continued and unpredicted traumas render the victim psychologically helpless. Id.
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acteristics and why they stay in long-term abusive relationships.19 Although
some women are able to break free of violent relationships by seeking refuge in
the law,2 ° battered women's shelters21 or divorce,22 others become trapped until
they kill their batterers.2 ,
The law in the United States traditionally did nothing to help battered wo-
men.24 In the latter part of the twentieth century, however, there has been a
wave of legislation designed to combat the problem of abusive relationships be-
tween spouses and live-in partners. 25 For example, spousal abuse is now a crime
in some states26 and battered women who kill their batterers in self-defense may
use expert testimony to show the reasonableness of their actions as battered wo-
men.27 Although it is becoming easier to prosecute men who batter women
under the criminal codes,28 many battered women are reluctant to cooperate
with prosecutors. There have been several reasons suggested for this: battered
women and their children are often economically dependent upon the abuser
and need him to work rather than be in jail;29 battered women are afraid of what
might happen to them when the batterer is released from jail; or the battered
woman just does not want to see someone she loves and cares about go to jail.
Monetary judgments in personal injury actions may therefore be an effective tool
19. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 158 (1989). See id. for a compre-
hensive look at homicide cases involving battered women who kill in self-defense. Evidence
about the Syndrome is admitted through the use of expert testimony. See infra notes 80-110
and accompanying text.
20. Restraining orders may be obtained under civil codes. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 540-553 (West Supp. 1992).
21. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, WOMEN'S RIGHTS HANDBOOK 122 (Sept. 1990).
22. Many tort actions for spousal abuse are brought at the time of divorce. See, e.g.,
Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
23. GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 22.
24. See infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
25. For a complete bibliography of domestic violence legislation in the United States, see
NATHAN AARON ROSEN, NATIONAL CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, BATTERED
WIVES: A COMPREHENSIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES, BOOKS AND STAT-
UTES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 77-84 (1988) [hereinafter BIBLIOGRAPHY].
26. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
27. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-82 (N.J. 1984). The use of expert testimony
about the Battered Woman Syndrome developed as a result of sex bias in the court system.
WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 3, § 9A.03[1], at 9A-18 (women viewed as unreasonable;
sex bias in self-defense law; misconceptions about battered women). For example, a man is
usually justified in killing to protect his "home, his family, or the chastity of his wife" or to
"fight[] off an assailant." Id. § 9A.02[2][b], at 9A-9. Women, however, historically have not
been allowed to use deadly force to protect themselves to the same extent as men. Id. at 9A-9
to -10. For example, a man can use "deadly force to prevent forcible sodomy between males"
but a woman cannot "use deadly force to repel a rape." Id. at 9A-10 (footnotes omitted)
(citing People v. Collins, 189 Cal. App. 2d 575, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1961); State v. Robinson,
328 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1959); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 236 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1968)).
28. See Julie A. Lipsman, Criminal Law: Domestic Violence, in 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAW 839 & n.1 (legislatures recognizing domestic violence is serious crime).
29. Because women often earn less than men, many women cannot afford to leave the
"community" even if they themselves work outside the home. Littleton, supra note 10, at 54.
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in the fight against violence toward women.30
Civil laws are making it easier for women to obtain the cooperation of po-
lice and obtain temporary restraining orders.3 1 Women have also sued domestic
partners 32 for personal injuries suffered during violent relationships, but with
little success. 33 At first, women were barred from recovery by judicially created
interspousal tort immunity. 34 Even though the doctrine of interspousal tort im-
munity has been virtually eliminated in many jurisdictions, 35 judges are making
exceptions to its abrogation in some cases when a woman sues her husband for
abuses suffered during marriage.36 Put another way, men are not held to the
same standard of care toward spouses as they are to strangers.3 7 As a result,
some battered women are not able to obtain the monetary damages for abuse
suffered even though society has declared domestic violence a crime.
38
After the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity, other barriers were
placed in front of battered women. In some cases, battered women were barred
from recovery because the typical one- or two-year period of limitations for tort
30. See Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
31. See infra note 70.
32. The terms spouse, domestic partner and mate are used interchangeably in this Com-
ment and all refer to a partner in an intimate and long-term domestic relationship.
33. See infra notes 111-254 and accompanying text for discussion of cases.
34. Interspousal tort immunity prevents one spouse from suing the other in tort. It is
based on the common law concept that husband and wife are one legal identity. See infra
notes 111-63 for a discussion of interspousal tort immunity and battered women.
35. Penton v. Penton, 135 So. 481 (Ala. 1931); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska
1963); Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d
70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1935); Brown v. Brown, 89 A.
889 (Conn. 1914); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972); Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Hosko v. Hosko,
187 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971); Noone v. Fink, 721 P.2d 1275 (Mont. 1986); Imig v. March,
279 N.W.2d 382 (Neb. 1979); Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657 (N.H. 1915); Merenoff v. Mere-
noff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J. 1978); Maestas v. Overton, 531 P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 324 N.E.2d 137 (N.Y. 1974); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E.
206 (N.C. 1920); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932); Shearer v. Shearer,
480 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1985); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1938); Hack v. Hack,
433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1981); Pardue v. Pardue, 166 S.E. 101 (S.C. 1932); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298
N.W. 266 (S.D. 1941); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Price v. Price, 732
S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980); Freehe v. Freehe, 500
P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash.
1984); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475
(Wis. 1926); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987).
36. See infra notes 393-406 and accompanying text.
37. Earle S. Lilly & Pamela E. George, Recovery of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress upon Divorce, 9 FAIRSHARE, Jan. 1989, at 26, 27; see Deborah L. Rhode, Women's
Rights and Social Wrongs, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 14, 15 (1991) (courts trivialize sexual
harassment and domestic violence as "'dalliances"' and "'flirtation'" (quoting Vinson v.
Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing)
(dalliances) and Sand v. Johnson Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716, 717 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (flirtation)).
38. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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actions had expired before they were finally induced to act.3 9 In other cases,
women were barred from tort causes of action on the basis of res judicata be-
cause they did not allege the tort cause of action during divorce proceedings.
40
Even in successful tort actions, women who suffered abuse over a long period of
time were denied full recovery because they did not leave the relationship after
the first act of violence. This view, however, does not recognize the effects of
systematic abuse over long periods of time. Commentators have criticized tradi-
tional tort law for not taking into account the experiences of women in battering
relationships. 4 '
In spite of these legal handicaps, four women have recently won large jury
awards against their batterers.4 2 In separate cases, expert testimony about the
Battered Woman Syndrome was presented to educate the jury about the psycho-
logical effects of an intimate battering relationship.4 3 This Comment argues that
expert testimony about the effects of the Battered Woman Syndrome can be used
to overcome the handicaps faced by women when recovery is sought under
traditional tort law.
Before bringing a tort action against a batterer for infliction of spousal
abuse, several procedural obstacles must be overcome. First, interspousal tort
immunity must have been abrogated in the state where the suit is filed. 44 Sec-
ond, if divorce proceedings have not yet commenced, or if they have and are not
yet final, it must be decided whether the tort action should be joined with the
divorce action.4" If divorce proceedings are over, it must be decided whether the
tort claim is barred by res judicata.4 6 Third, are there other possible bars to the
action, such as the statute of limitations?4 7 Finally, in a claim for spousal abuse,
the Battered Woman Syndrome should be used to show that the tort is of a
continuous nature and as evidence of emotional distress.
48
39. See infra notes 301-39 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
41. Littleton, supra note 10, at 26. Littleton adds, "[i]t is often said that rape victims are
raped twice-once by the rapist and once by the legal system. If that is so, then battered
women are battered three times--once by the batterer, a second time by society and finally by
the legal system." Id. at 29. See generally Rhode, supra note 37, at 13-14 (arguing that equal-
ity in legal status does not necessarily mean social equality because law does not take into
account daily experiences of women).
42. See Gladish v. Simmons, 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1323 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1985)
($100,000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ($362,000); Twyman v.
Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (writ granted Dec. 19, 1990) ($15,000); Spot-
light: Victim of Battered Woman's Syndrome Recovers in a Civil Action for Battery and Emo-
tional Distress, 33 Ass'N TRIAL LAW. AM. 314, 314 (1990) (Curtis v. Curtis, No. 14,514
(Idaho Dist. Ct. May 18, 1990) (unreported case) ($1,000,000)) [hereinafter Spotlight].
43. See Gladish, 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 1323; Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314.
44. See infra notes 111-63 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 164-254 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 164-254 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 301-39 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 422-33 and accompanying text.
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This Comment traces the development of domestic violence legislation and
the use of expert testimony about the Battered Woman Syndrome in the United
States.49 It analyzes the recent tort litigation involving domestic violence and
how expert testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome can help women break
the cycle of violence by helping them become economically independent.5 0 Fi-
nally, this Comment suggests that the courts and legislatures should recognize a
new tort of spousal abuse which would facilitate compensating women for
mental and physical injuries inflicted by battering domestic partners.5 1
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW
A. Wife-Beating Historically Condoned
Violence by men toward their families has been tolerated and even con-
doned throughout history.52 In at least one anthropologist's view, the creation
of the patriarchal society began with man's practice of warfare, his mastery of
weapons and the use of sex to nurture aggressive personalities.5 3 Religion and
the law sanctioned wife beating for centuries, with the church encouraging men
to beat their wives into obedience.5 4 The Judeo-Christian belief in male domi-
nance over women is rooted in the theory of creationism wherein God created
man first, and woman as an afterthought only to keep man company. 55 The
theory further ingrains misogyny into western culture by the belief that it is
woman, in the form of Eve, who is responsible for the introduction of sin into
the world and the fall of the human race.5 6 These notions carried over into
western culture the idea "[m]arriage for her was to be a condition of bondage,
maternity a period of suffering and anguish, and in silence and subjection, she
49. See infra notes 52-110 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 111-433 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 434-72 and accompanying text.
52. Laura Crites, A Judicial Guide to Understanding Wife Abuse, JUDGES' J., Summer
1985, at 5, 6.
53. MARVIN HARRIS, CANNIBALS AND KINGS 81 (Vintage Books ed. 1991).
54. Crites, supra note 52, at 6. For a thorough look at how religions have condoned wife
beating and its effect on the law, see Kathleen A. McDonald, Battered Wives, Religion & Law:
An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 251 (1990); see also UNITED STATES
COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB 1 (1982) [hereinafter RULE OF
THUMB] (church men encouraged to beat wives). For a woman's interpretation of The Bible,
see ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN'S BIBLE: THE ORIGINAL FEMINIST ATTACK
ON THE BIBLE (abr. ed., Polygon Books 1985) (New York, European Publishing Co. pt. I
1895, pt. 111898).
55. Genesis 2:18-22; STANTON, supra note 54, at 20; McDonald, supra note 54, at 267.
56. Genesis 3:1-24; STANTON, supra note 54, at 23-27; Crites, supra note 52, at 6. It has
been suggested that Eve was superior to Adam and Adam aided and abetted the serpent.
STANTON, supra note 54, at 26-27. It was Adam, not Eve, who was given the commandment
not to eat the forbidden fruit, for Eve had not been yet formed. Id. at 26. It was Eve who
intelligently debated with the serpent while Adam stood by doing nothing. Id. Adam is por-
trayed as a "dastardly" soul who hides behind Eve, whining when confronted by God. Id. at
27. See also CHERIS KRAMARAE & PAULA A. TREICHLER, A FEMINIST DICTIONARY 145
(1990), for alternate views of Eve as a "strong, courageous, innovative" woman.
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was to play the role of a dependent on man's bounty for all her material
wants."5 7
The first marriage law in Roman times proclaimed that wives should
"'conform themselves entirely to the temper of their husbands and the husbands
to rule their wives as necessary and inseparable possessions.' 58 The middle
ages saw a barbaric acceptance of extreme cruelty to women for as much as
scolding their husbands in public.5 9 These misogynistic views were incorporated
into British common law where a man was allowed to beat his wife with a "rod
no thicker than his thumb." 6 Not until the late nineteenth century was the
right to wife beating explicitly withdrawn.6 1 Wife-beating, however, was still
not a crime.
62
Even though women were theoretically protected by law from crimes like
assault, battery and rape, 63 violence in the home was not afforded the same sig-
nificance. 64 Men who abused their wives were not prosecuted.65 Commentators
attribute this to several factors including gender bias, lack of an understanding
of the psycho-dynamics of crime and lack of awareness of the seriousness of the
crime.6 6 Judges also lacked understanding of the seriousness of domestic vio-
lence and tended to trivialize and demean the complaints of battered women.
67
57. STANTON, supra note 54, at 7; see also McDonald, supra note 54, at 271 (adding that
"force is a necessary corollary" to subjugation of women).
58. McDonald, supra note 54, at 254 (quoting R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash,
Wives: The "Appropriate' Victims of Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426, 427 (1977-78)).
59. Id. at 255.
When you see your wife commit an offense, don't rush at her with insults and violent
blows.... Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her. And if this still doesn't work...
take up a stick and beat her soundly, for it is better to punish the body and correct
the soul than to damage the soul and spare the body.... Then readily beat her, not in
rage but out of charity and concern for her soul, so that the beating will redound to
your merit and her good.
RULE OF THUMB, supra note 54, at 1 (footnote admitted) (quoting TERRY DAVIDSON, CONJU-
GAL CRIME 99 (1978) (passage attributed to Friar Cherubino of Siena's RULES OF MARRIAGE
compiled between 1450 and 1481)).
60. Crites, supra note 52, at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. McDonald, supra note 54, at 257.
65. Crites, supra note 52, at 6; see McDonald, supra note 54, at 279 (citing State v. Oliver,
70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874) (discussing North Carolina statute allowing men to beat their wives)).
Current domestic violence legislation recognizes that abuse can occur between household
members other than husband and wife, such as unmarried couples or family members. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 540-542 (West Supp. 1992).
66. Crites, supra note 52, at 7.
67. Id. at 6-7 (citing ATTORNEY GEN. TASK FORCE REP. ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL
REPORT 12 (1984)); Sheila James Kuehl, Achieving Equal Justice for Victims of Domestic Vio-
lence, in ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE COURTS OF CALIFORNIA,
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE OF WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS: THE DRAFT REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 5 (Draft
1990); Rhode, supra note 37, at 15.
[Vol. 25:10251032
SPOUSAL ABUSE
Some states have recently passed legislation making domestic violence a
crime.61 In California all law enforcement agencies are required to implement
written policies regarding their response to domestic violence calls.6 9 California
also provides for stay-away orders under the penal code. 7° The penal code pro-
vides protection from continuing abuse by a spouse or cohabitant of the opposite
sex.7 1 The statute covers spouses, cohabitants of the opposite sex and co-par-
ents.72 However, the criminal statutes are still for the most part ineffectively
enforced7 3 and provide the battered woman with little or no redress. 74
In recent years, state legislatures have enacted civil laws to help prevent
recurring acts of violence between spouses or household members. 75 These civil
laws provide a battered woman with the means to obtain restraining orders in
order to keep the batterer away from her.76 Restraining orders, however, may
not be enough protection because there is the danger of provoking an abusive
husband to further violence.77 Restraining orders provide no physical protec-
tion and cannot be enforced until the person they are supposed to restrict vio-
lates the order.7 ' The woman holding the restraining order then must telephone
the police and wait for assistance. The primary problem, however, is that even
though informed that a threat has been made on the victim's life, or even that a
crime is occurring, the police may not respond until after it is too late.7 9
68. See Linda Lengyel, Survey of State Domestic Violence Legislation, 10(1/2) LEGAL
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 59 (1990).
69. California added its statutes in 1984. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700-13731 (West
Supp. 1992) (setting domestic violence policy).
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). A stay-away order is available
under the criminal codes. Like a restraining order, the person against whom the stay-away
order is obtained must refrain from coming into contact with the person holding the order. A
stay-away order is available if it is likely that the defendant will use intimidation to dissuade
the victim or witness from cooperating with the authorities. Stay-away orders may restrict
access to the family residence and bar any communication with the victim by the defendant or
his agent. Id.
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992). Requirements for prosecution
under this law are: (1) willful infliction on a spouse or cohabitant of the opposite sex; and (2)
bodily injury resulting in traumatic condition. Id.; see People v. Thompson, 160 Cal. App. 3d
220, 206 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1984) (husband convicted under Penal Code § 273.5 for corporeal
injury to spouse).
72. This law does not apply to same sex partners, parents of offenders, children, former
cohabitants and other members of the household such as relatives or roommates. Punishment
for a misdemeanor is up to one year in county jail and a fine of up to $6000. If prosecuted as a
felony, punishment is two, three or four years in state prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5
(West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
73. See WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 3, § 9.05, at 9-14 to -17 (police reluctant to
make arrests; prosecutors fail to prosecute with same vigor as stranger-stranger cases; court
employees and judges insensitive or give misinformation).
74. Id. § 9.01, at 9-3.
75. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 540-553 (West Supp. 1992).
76. Id. §§ 545-549.
77. See KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 9-10.
78. See id. ch. 2, at 27.
79. For example, when Maria Navarro called the Los Angeles police on August 28, 1989
April 1992] 1033
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
B. Development of Battered Woman Syndrome
Many battered women suffer from a form of the debilitating Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder known as Battered Woman Syndrome.80 The characteristics of
a battered woman were first described by psychotherapist Lenore Walker in her
book, The Battered Woman.8 1 The Syndrome is characterized by psychological
effects from repeated physical and psychological abuse over a period of time. A
pattern of behavior between the batterer and his victim develops, during which
he manipulates his victim in order to fulfill his needs for power.
82
This pattern of behavior is known as the cycle of violence.8 3 Walker de-
scribes it as a three-stage, endless pattern of escalating violence.8 4 When com-
bined with certain social factors, the psychological effect on the victim renders
to tell them her ex-husband was on his way over to kill her, the response was "what can we
do?" Kuehl, supra note 11, at 11-7. As pointed out by Kuehl, if Navarro had been a celebrity
or political candidate, something would have been done to protect her. Id.
80. The disorder has been widely recognized by the psychiatric community. E.g., State v.
Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1984) (expert testimony about Battered Woman Syn-
drome admissible to help understand battered woman's behavior).
81. WALKER, supra note 3.
82. KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 5. Domestic abuse is progressive and spiralling in nature, escalating over time
and increasing in frequency and seriousness. Id. The relationship begins with an initial honey-
moon phase in which the batterer obtains a commitment from his victim. Id. at 6; WALKER,
supra note 3, at 55.
The cycle of violence begins with a tension phase. Id. at 56-59.
During the tension phase, the victim walks on eggshells. She may appease the
batterer in order to prevent escalation of the tension. She believes that by accommo-
dating him, she can make things better.
The emotional abuse usually starts after she has made a commitment to him.
The batterer interprets every little failure by her as an attack on him. Regardless of
what the victim does, her partner goes to the explosion phase.
The victim comes to recognize in this phase that something is going to happen.
She picks up his verbal cues. He may say something like "I need to teach you a
lesson." The victim may seek help at this stage, but it is difficult to get because no
violence has yet occurred. She will experience depression, anxiety, and helplessness.
Physical symptoms will appear, including headache, upset stomach, and an increas-
ing sense of worthlessness and loss of control.
KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 6.
The tension phase escalates into the explosion phase. WALKER, supra note 3, at 59-65.
During the explosion phase, the abuse occurs. The incidents which set off the
explosion may be trivial or unknown. The victim is purposefully kept off balance;
what is pleasing behavior one day may be the trigger of violence the next. The man
feels out of control and thinks that by abusing the woman he can regain his feelings
of power and control.
Both realize he is out of control. She simply tries to survive.
If help arrives, the abuser may appear more rational than the victim. He has the
greater emotional control. Often, the police report reflects her difficulty: she may
appear confused, hysterical, uncommunicative.
KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 6-7.
Finally, there is a return to the honeymoon phase. WALKER, supra note 3, at 65-70.
The cycle returns to the honeymoon phase and begins again. There is love,
tearful apologies, reconciliation, promise, hope of change and minimization of the
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her psychologically paralyzed. 85 Walker likens this effect to learned helpless-
ness.86 She theorizes that when a woman believes she cannot get help, she will
stop trying, and therefore has no alternative but to stay with the batterer.87
Walker uses learned helplessness to attempt to answer the question, "why didn't
she leave?
' 88
Although expert testimony can be used to explain to the judge and jury why
she didn't leave, it can also show that the issue is not that a woman did not
leave, but the batterer himself has committed a wrong as well as the nature of his
violence. This can be very isolating for the woman .... Her helpers or friends may
encourage her to overlook the violence. She will find fewer friends for support.
The batterer will make excuses, such as "it was the alcohol." However, she
should realize that he chose to hit her, not a neighbor or some other person out on
the street.
The woman will be loving and nurturing. She will try to meet all the abuser's
anticipated needs out of fear of his violence. She may believe she can control him.
But he sees her behavior as rewarding or condoning his violence.
The abuser knows he has done wrong and makes every effort to be forgiven by
the victim. He buys her gifts and flowers. He promises never to hurt her again. She
wants to believe him. However, it doesn't matter what she does to please him, he will
find fault and excuses to be abusive again.
KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 7.
The cycle then repeats itself. WALKER, supra note 3, at 69.
At the center of the cycle are denial and minimization-survival techniques used by bat-
tered women and their abusers. KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 4; see WALKER, supra
note 3, at 56, 62-63, 67-69. If she can minimize the violence or deny its tragic consequences,
she can continue to believe that her marriage can work. For the batterer, there are excuses.
KuEHL et al., supra note 7, ch. 2, at 4-5. He may try to deny the seriousness of abuse by
saying things like "I only pushed her," "I was drunk," or "I had an argument with the boss."
Id. at 5.
85. WALKER, supra note 3, at 43.
86. See id. at 45-54. Walker's theory is based on the experiments of psychologist Martin
Seligman. Id. at 45. Seligman administered electrical shocks to dogs in cages. Id. at 46. No
matter how the dogs responded, the shocks did not cease. Id. After a short period of time, the
dogs stopped trying to escape the shocks. Id. Littleton criticizes Walker's analogy of women
with dogs and points out that Walker's theory places the "fault" with the women instead of
with the batterers who caused-through random, uncontrolled violence-the women to react
in this way. Littleton, supra note 10, at 38-42. These women should not be stereotyped as
helpless because of the enormous courage and strength in their ability to continue to survive in
extremely dangerous situations. Id. at 42. In Littleton's view, the focus should be "explicitly
and continuously placed where it belongs-on the intolerable conditions under which women
live." Id.
87. Id.
88. WALKER, supra note 18, at 47.
The question most often asked about battered women is, "Why don't they
leave?" The underlying assumption is that then the battering would stop. Years of
research have proved that assumption to be untrue; the abuse often escalates at the
point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then. The
apparent passivity and immobility of battered women is difficult for most people to
understand. But some important research in the field of human behavior, and several
important theories that have evolved out of that research, are helpful in making the
battered woman's behavior understandable.
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victim's injuries. Furthermore, evidence shows that even if a woman leaves a
battering relationship the batterer's behavior does not change-judges and juries
must understand she is not the cause of the problem.
89
Expert testimony is opinion evidence given by a specialist regarding areas of
expertise not commonly understood by the average layperson. 90 Although ulti-
mately excluded from trial, expert testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome
was first recognized in Ibn-Tamas v. United States.9 1 Beverly Ibn-Tamas was
convicted of second-degree murder for killing her husband after a battering inci-
dent.92 In order to support her claim of self-defense, the defense offered the
testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker.93 Dr. Walker's testimony described the "phe-
nomenon of wife battering," and gave her opinion as to whether Mrs. Ibn-
Tamas's personality matched that of a battered woman.
94
The trial court excluded the testimony for three reasons. 95 First, the court
held that the testimony pertained to prior acts of the victim which the jury was
not entitled to hear.96 Second, the court held that expert testimony would in-
vade the province of the jury, which judges the credibility of the witnesses.
97
Third, the court held that Dr. Walker's conclusion that the decedent was a bat-
terer was irrelevant because he was not on trial.98
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case
on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony.09 The court of appeals found
that the expert testimony, if admissible, would have enhanced the defendant's
credibility during cross-examination and also supported her testimony regarding
her belief of imminent danger at the time of the shooting. 1° ° The court of ap-
peals also determined that the probative value of the testimony would outweigh
the risk of its "'engender[ing] vindictive passions within the jury.' ,itol The
court reasoned that identifying Mrs. Ibn-Tamas as a battered wife would have a
substantial bearing on her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing.
10 2
The court of appeals found that the trial court did not clearly state its find-
89. REV. MARIE M. FORTUNE & DENISE HORMANN, MSW, FAMILY VIOLENCE: A
WORKSHOP MANUAL FOR CLERGY AND OTHER SERVICE PROVIDERS 56 (1980) (National
Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Monograph Series No. 6, Apr.
1981).
90. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (6th ed. 1990).
91. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 171-74 (discussing
Ibn-Tamas).
92. lbn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 628, 630-31.
93. Id. at 631.
94. Id. (comparing Ibn-Tamas's personality to 110 battered women Walker studied).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 628.
100. Id. at 634.
101. Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977)).
102. Id.
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ings of admissibility under the threefold test used by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals for determining admissibility of expert testimony.10 3 The
court held it could not as a matter of law affirm or reverse the decision of the
trial court to exclude the testimony.' 4 On remand, the trial court found that
the defendant failed to establish the general acceptance of the methodology used
by Dr. Walker in her study and therefore failed to meet the third prong of the
admissibility test.105 The court of appeals then affirmed these findings.
10 6
Even though Dr. Walker's testimony regarding battered women ultimately
was excluded from Mrs. Ibn-Tamas's defense, the case was a landmark deci-
sion.10 7 It was the first time an appellate court found such testimony beyond the
ken of the average juror. 10 8 The door was opened for the use of expert testi-
mony about the Battered Woman Syndrome.
In 1984 the Washington Supreme Court held that scientific understanding
of the Battered Woman Syndrome was sufficiently developed to allow the Syn-
drome to be admitted as evidence of self-defense.'0 9 Today it is recognized as
evidence of self-defense in a growing number of states. 10 As this evidence be-
comes widely accepted by criminal courts, it follows that it could be helpful to
battered women in other contexts, including tort cases.
III. POTENTIAL BARS TO INTERSPOUSAL TORT LITIGATION
Before a battered woman can recover in tort against her batterer for injuries
suffered, there are several factors to consider. First, if the couple was married at
the time of the battering incidents, could any tort claims be barred by the doc-
trine of interspousal tort immunity? Second, if tort claims are filed against the
batterer, should they be joined with a divorce action if the parties are married?
Third, if the parties are already divorced, will the tort actions be barred by res
judicata? Fourth, what torts should be alleged and are most likely to succeed?
103. Id. at 632-39 (citing Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 973 (1977)).
104. Id. at 640. The test given by the court is as follows:
(1) [T]he subject matter "must be so distinctively related to some science, profession,
business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman"; (2) "the
witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as
to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his
search for truth"; and (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if "the state of the perti-
nent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted
even by an expert."
Id. at 632-33 (quoting Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
973 (1977)).
105. See id. at 640.
106. See id. (refusing to overrule trial court as matter of law).
107. GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 174.
108. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 635; GILLESPIE, supra note 19, at 174.
109. State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash. 1984).
110. See, eg., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse,
555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984); see also GILLESPIE,
supra note 19, at 179 (discussing admission of Battered Woman Syndrome).
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Finally, will existing tort law adequately compensate the battered victim for her
injuries? This Comment argues that a new tort of spousal abuse is needed be-
cause existing tort law does not adequately compensate battered women for inju-
ries suffered during abusive relationships.
A. Interspousal Tort Immunity
Interspousal tort immunity prohibits one spouse from seeking tort damages
from the other.111 This doctrine was "first recognized in the United States dur-
ing the 1860s '' 12 and remained the majority rule until the 1970s. 1 " Because of
this tort immunity, a woman could not seek civil damages from a man who beat
her if he was her husband.1
14
The rationale underlying the immunity between spouses was the common
law notion that a husband and wife were one legal identity." 5 Unfortunately
for the wife, this legal identity was the man's and he maintained control over her
life and property. 116 As Blackstone phrased the idea, "[b]y marriage, the hus-
band and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of her husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover,
she performs everything." " 7 This reasoning extended to the physical chastising
of a wife by the husband.' 18 Therefore, a wife could not bring a lawsuit against
her husband for abuse suffered during marriage, except in a divorce action.
1 19
Because of this merger fiction, the first reported assault case against a hus-
band by his wife apparently was not until 1863.120 In Longendyke v.
Longendyke,12 1 the plaintiff-wife based her action on New York's Married Wo-
man's Property Acts. 122 The court held that a married woman could not sue
111. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 359 (1989);
see also KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 122, at 901-04 (discussing interspousal tort immunity).
112. Tobias, supra note 111, at 359.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 371 (" '[Nature and connection between [husband and wife is] such that no
[battery] can give either a right of action to recover damages.'" (quoting T. REEVE, THE LAW
OF BARON AND FEMME 65 (1st ed. 1816))).
115. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 122, at 901.
116. Tobias, supra note 111, at 363-64.
117. Id. at 364 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442, reprinted in W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859 (4th ed. 1971)).
118. See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 456 (1868) (husband has right to moderate "correc-
tion" of wife, even if no provocation).
119. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 589 (1858).
120. Tobias, supra note 111, at 371-72 & n.63; see Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb.
366, 367-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863).
121. 44 Barb. 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863).
122. Id. at 367; Tobias, supra note 111, at 371 n.63. Because of the merger fiction, a hus-
band managed and controlled all of his wife's separate property and was entitled to her per-
sonal property as well. Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 369. Married Woman's Property Acts were
passed to allow women to hold and control thei; own property. KEETON et al., supra note 2,
§ 122, at 902. The New York Laws at issue in Longendyke gave married women the right to
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her husband in an action for assault and battery.1 23 The court gave five reasons
for its decision: (1) the married women's acts only gave women rights to distin-
guish property from their husbands and did not give a right of action against
them; 12 4 (2) the action was against public policy because the law was to protect
"conjugal union and tranquility"; 125 (3) a broad construction of the married
women's acts would "sow the seeds of perpetual domestic discord and broil"
and tempt women to encroach upon their husbands' property;126 (4) even
though the acts broadened the married women's right to contract, they did not
contemplate women selling property to husbands (and therefore did not contem-
plate actions against them either); 127 and (5) husbands and their property were
exempt from liability from contracts or bargains made by wives. 128 The court
also implied that the husband had a right to use force to "restrain" his wife.
129
Even though the Married Woman's Property Acts gave women the right to
"'sue and be sued as if they were not married,' ,13o judges created the common
law notion of interspousal tort immunity to prevent tort cases between spouses
from approximately 1863 until 1913.131 Most judges simply adopted the rule
without explanation, 132 but a few courts cited the maxim of unity and stated
that wives "(1) had no substantive civil causes of action against anyone, includ-
ing their husbands; (2) were under a procedural disability, requiring that hus-
bands file tort suits on their behalf; or (3) were not entitled to damages recovered
because any such award would belong to their husbands."' 133 Interspousal tort
immunity became a "common-law rule that could be altered only by legisla-
tion." 13 4 The courts' stated policy for disallowing interspousal tort suits was to
protect marital harmony and connubial peace.' 35 Additionally the government
bring suit for matters relating to their separate property. Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 368. The
acts also gave married women the right to bring suit and recover damages for personal injuries.
Id. The damages would be deemed the wife's separate property. Id.
123. Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 366.
124. Id. at 368.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 369.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 370.
129. The court gave few facts regarding the incident giving rise to the cause of action but
did state the wife "was conducting herself in a very rude and indecent manner, and attempted
to strike the defendant. That the force which the defendant used was necessary to restrain the
plaintiff." Id. at 366. The court never stated what actions constituted "rude and indecent" or
how much force was used. See id.
130. Tobias, supra note 111, at 372 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-170 (Law. Co-op.
1976)).
131. See id. at 383-98.
132. Id. at 385 & nn.123-26.
133. Id. at 385 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 386.
135. Id. at 389; see Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877) ("[I]t is better to draw the
curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive." (quoting State v.
Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874))), overruled by MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me.
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had an interest in protecting wedlock and the family.
1 36
If the judges were concerned with promoting marital harmony, they could
have permitted interspousal tort claims on the theory that intentional infliction
of injury would be deterred.1 37 Instead, the judges reasoned that harmony was
promoted because the spouses would forgive and forget.' 38 Unfortunately, this
left women to do all the forgiving and forgetting without the redress of their
injuries.
139
It was not until the 1910s that women started to break through the inter-
spousal tort immunity doctrine. 14° The courts started using the Married Wo-
man's Property Acts to promote policies such as the need for deterrence from
wife abuse or the redress of harm for women. 14 1 By 1970 interspousal tort im-
munity became the minority rule 142 and today it has been completely or par-
tially abolished in most states. 14 3 Nevertheless, some states still recognize
interspousal tort immunity in some eases,144 and in states where it has been
completely abolished, judges are carving out an exception to the abrogation. 145
In Burns v. Burns 146 the Supreme Court of Mississippi examined the poli-
cies underlying that state's interspousal tort immunity doctrine. 147 In Burns a
wife sued her husband for assault and battery after he beat her while they were
separated and their divorce was pending.' 48 The court decided to reexamine
common law interspousal tort immunity because "'when a rule of common law
1980). It is unclear whose marital harmony and peace these judges were trying to protect,
because there is no peace and harmony in marriage for a woman who is beaten by her husband.
136. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35, 103 P. 219, 220 (1909), overruled by Self v. Self, 58
Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366,
368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863).
137. Tobias, supra note 111, at 391.
138. Abbott, 67 Me. at 307.
139. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text for a discussion of statistics indicating
women bear the brunt of domestic violence.
140. Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920) (wife no longer her husband's chattel).
141. See, eg., Johnson v. Johnson, 77 So. 335, 338 (Ala. 1917) (wife may sue husband for
tort of assault; remedies of divorce and alimony are illusory and inadequate); Gilman v.
Gilman, 95 A. 657, 657 (N.H. 1915) (wife may maintain action for assault against husband);
Crowell, 105 S.E. at 210; see also Tobias, supra note 111, at 409-11 (courts relied on Married
Woman's Property Acts, rejected interspousal immunity and used public policy arguments to
allow interspousal torts).
142. Tobias, supra note 111, at 435; see Burns v. Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211-12 (Miss.
1988).
143. Tobias, supra note 111, at 435. See supra note 35 for a list of states abrogating inter-
spousal tort immunity.
144. The rule was partially abrogated for vehicular torts only in Arizona, Idaho, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia. Burns, 518 So. 2d at 1212-13.
145. See infra notes 391-404 and accompanying text.
146. 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1988).
147, Id. at 1209-10.
148. Id. at 1206.
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ceases to be reasonable and just, it is no longer the common law.' ,149
The court cited three reasons for following the doctrine: legal unity, pro-
motion of peace and harmony in the home and the avoidance of fraudulent
claims.' 50 The court found the legal unity fiction of a husband and wife in mar-
riage was based on antiquated notions that women were merely their husbands'
chattel. 151 As these views disappeared, the court reasoned, there was no differ-
ence between the rights of married and single women. 152 Analogizing the status
of women to that of ex-slaves, the court said that the legislature could have kept
them in bondage and subject to their husbands' tyranny and fury, but instead,
had given them 'the same rights as others.' 5 3
The court found the promotion of domestic tranquility an illusion, saying
that the peace of the relationship is destroyed by the act of violence, not the
lawsuit following it.154 Preventing women from suing, the court decided, does
not prevent ill-will or anger, it just deprives women of adequate remedies.
155
Although divorce and criminal laws were available to battered spouses, the court
held that these were inadequate.
156
In response to the argument that interspousal tort suits promote fraud, the
court in Burns stated that if the judicial process was so ineffective that it must
deny relief because someone may commit fraud in the future, then it should
abolish all causes of action. 57 The court said that juries, having common sense,
were capable of discovering fraud and to believe otherwise insulted their
intelligence.' 58
At least one case has held that interspousal tort immunity does not com-
pletely bar an action between spouses, it only suspends it for the duration of the
marriage. In the Louisiana case of Duplechin v. Toce,15 9 a husband beat his wife
and she sued him in tort.' 6 The case was dismissed because of Louisiana's
interspousal tort immunity.161 After the divorce, the wife brought the action
again and this time obtained a verdict in her favor. 162 The court held that inter-
spousal tort immunity only suspended the right to bring an action until the par-
ties legally separate or divorce.' 63 Thus, interspousal tort immunity did not
149. Id. at 1208 (quoting Planters' Oil Mill v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 121 So. 138, 140 (Miss.
1929)).
150. Id. at 1209.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1210.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1210-11.
158. Id. at 1211.
159. 497 So. 2d 763 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 764.
162. Id. at 764-66.
163. Id. at 765.
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forever bar the right to sue.
B. Problems of Res Judicata and Joinder
If the battered woman is married to her batterer and is contemplating di-
vorce, it must be decided whether to join the tort action to the divorce action.
This may be determined by the jurisdiction in which the divorce is filed. Some
states forbid joining a tort action to a divorce proceeding. " Other states allow
joinder but do not make it mandatory.1 6 ' However, tort claims may be barred
by res judicata if brought after a conclusion of the divorce proceeding even in
jurisdictions not mandating joinder. 1 6 Finally, one state, New Jersey, mandates
the litigation of divorce and tort claims in the same proceeding.
167
1. States forbidding joinder of tort and divorce claims
Colorado, 16 8 Iowa169 and Utah 170 have expressly forbidden the joinder of
tort claims to divorce actions.17 1 The rationale for keeping the causes of action
separate include the "peculiar" nature of divorce proceedings. 172 It is thought
that, in order to promote amicable settlements in divorce proceedings, the di-
vorce should not be tried with claims adversarial in nature)"
7
The Supreme Court of Utah does not permit tort actions to be tried with
divorce actions, 174 but in order to prevent unnecessary litigation, it has held that
tort actions should be tried before the divorce. 175 However, a subsequent tort
action will not be barred by res judicata if the judge improperly allowed the
divorce action to proceed first.'
76
In a Utah case, Noble v. Noble, 177 the plaintiff-wife was granted a divorce
on the ground of cruelty because her husband had shot her at close range and
164. E.g. IOWA CODE § 598.3 (1981); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); see infra notes 168-86.
165. See, eg., Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d 1180 (Idaho 1988); see infra notes 188-231 and
accompanying text.
166. See, eg., Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983); see infra notes 232-41 and accom-
panying text.
167. Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979). But see Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (exception to compulsory joinder rule).
168. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602.
169. IOWA CODE § 598.3 (1981).
170. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).
171. Linda J. Kroning, Joinder of Tort and Divorce Claims, in SECTION OF FAMILY LAW,
AM. BAR ASS'N., MARITAL & PARENTAL TORTS: A GUIDE TO CAUsEs OF ACTION, ARGU-
MENTS, AND DAMAGES 93-94 (1990) [hereinafter MARITAL TORTS].
172. Id. at 93.
173. Id.
174. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1374.
177. 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).
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left her disabled.1 71 She then brought an action in tort alleging battery, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. 179 Her defendant-husband
tried to bar the tort action under the doctrine of res judicata because the trial
court had considered his wife's injuries and medical expenses when awarding
alimony and property to her."8 This, he claimed, amounted to an award of
damages for his tort.18 1 The court held that the tort claims were not barred by
res judicata because they could not be and were not tried with the divorce ac-
tion.18 2 The only justification given by the court for not allowing joinder of tort
claims to divorce actions was that tort claims "are legal in nature [and] should
be kept separate from divorce actions, which are equitable in nature,"
18 3
This conflicts with the notion of merger of law and equity in the American
court system.1 84 It is not unusual for law and equity actions to be tried to-
gether.18 5 Injury trials, the judge will reserve decision on all equitable matters,
leaving the jury to its own province.
186
The decision to forbid joinder of tort and divorce claims could have the
effect of deterring battered women from seeking redress of their injuries in tort
actions. A separate action will require the expenditure of additional resources,
financial as well as emotional, which the battered woman may not have. For
her, the trauma of divorcing her batterer may make it unlikely she will want to
go through another trial after she gets divorced.
2. Joinder discouraged but not forbidden
Alaska, 187 Arizona,18 8  Idaho, 189 Indiana,"9 ° Massachusetts, 19 1 New
Hampshire 192 and Wisconsin 193 strongly discourage joinder of tort claims to
divorce actions.1 94 In all of these states, courts have discussed the fundamental
differences between divorce and tort actions. Although they did not expressly
178. Id. at 1370-71.
179. Id. at 1371.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1374.
183. Id. at 1371.
184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.' ").
185. See Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942) (remedies in law and
equity available to parties in same court and same action).
186. See, eg., Maharam v. Maharam, 575 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. Div. 1991) (in tort
action tried with divorce proceedings, jury first renders verdict on tort issue, then court deter-
mines equitable distribution and support).
187. Nelson v. Jones, 787 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1990).
188. Windauer v. O'Connor, 485 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. 1971).
189. Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d 118 (Idaho 1988).
190. McNevin v. McNevin, 447 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
191. Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1988).
192. Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909 (N.H. 1987).
193. Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988).
194. See Kroning, supra note 171, at 93-94.
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state joinder was forbidden, the courts' strong language suggests they discourage
such joinder.
In Aubert v. Aubert,195 a New Hampshire case, the husband-plaintiff
brought a personal injury action against his wife after having been granted a
divorce on the grounds of extreme mental cruelty.' 96 The court held that a
cause of action in tort is "fundamentally different from a divorce proceeding,
and that the respective issues involved are entirely distinct."1 97 For example,
the type of relief available in the two actions is different. In a divorce action, the
relief sought is the dissolution of the legal relationship of "man and wife"'198
while the relief sought in a tort action is the recovery of compensation for "inju-
ries suffered as a result of a civil wrong."' 199 The court explained alimony could
not be a bar to recovery because it "is an allowance for support and mainte-
nance" with no other purposes.200 The court held damages may not be awarded
and liability cannot be determined in a divorce proceeding.
20 1
In a Massachusetts case, Heacock v. Heacock,2 °2 a separated couple had an
argument over the phone.20 3 The husband went to the wife's house to continue
the argument, but she would not let him in.2 4 He then broke the glass on the
door, grabbed her arm and smashed her head against the door causing severe
injury.20 5 She later filed separate divorce and tort claims.20 6 The trial court
dismissed the tort claim on grounds of "issue preclusion, claim preclusion or res
judicata, . . . whichever happens to be the best one.",20 7 The appeals court re-
versed, holding that the tort was not based on the same underlying claim as the
208divorce.
2°
The court stated that the purpose of a tort is to redress a legal wrong.
20 9
The purpose of divorce is to sever the marital relationship and fix the corre-
sponding rights and obligations.210 The awards in a divorce action are not to
compensate for injuries, but to provide economic support to the dependent
spouse.2 11 Property division is to recognize and equitably recompense the
195. 529 A.2d 909 (N.H. 1987).
196. Id. at 911.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 912.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Kennard v. Kennard, 179 A. 414, 419 (N.H. 1935)).
201. Id.
202. 520 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1988).
203. Id. at 152.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 153.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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party's respective contributions to the relationship. 2 12 The husband had argued
that the policy behind claim preclusion is to prevent piecemeal litigation; how-
ever, the court found this would not be the case with a divorce and subsequent
tort action.21 3
In a case from Alabama, Ex parte Harrington,21 4 a woman was paralyzed
for life after her husband shot her.2 15 She filed for divorce in April and for
personal injury recovery in June.2 16 The husband tried to have the tort claims
dismissed, claiming that the divorce and tort actions were the same because they
stemmed from the same wrongful act-the shooting.2 17 The husband argued
that the same act may give rise to multiple legal theories, but essentially were the
same action.21 The only difference was the relief sought and because of the
merger of law and equity, separate suits in divorce and tort were barred.2 19
The court said the two actions were not the same.220 The mere fact that the
wife had charged the husband with assault in the divorce proceeding did not
make it identical to the assault and battery action.221 Therefore, claim preclu-
sion did not bar the tort action.
3. States allowing or mandating joinder
Courts in eight states, Alabama,2 22 Arkansas,2 23 Georgia,22 4 Nevada,22 5
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 450 So. 2d 99 (Ala. 1984).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 100.
218. Id. at 101.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. The court stated that there were two tests to determine whether the causes of action
were the same: res judicata or the same evidence test. Id. at 101. However, the court did not
apply these tests. Id. at 101-02.
222. Jackson v. Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala. 1984).
223. Smith v. Smith, 14 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1609 (Ark. 1988).
224. Mize v. Mize, 56 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (contract action properly litigated in
former divorce action).
225. Pelletier v. Pelletier, 742 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1987) (conversion action joined to divorce
action). In Pelletier the tort action was improperly filed by a third party (the wife's mother-in-
law) as a counterclaim to a divorce action initiated by the wife. Id. Although the court stated
it had been improperly joined to the divorce action because the third party had no interest in
the divorce action, the court implied that the joinder of a tort to a divorce action would be
proper if filed by one of the parties to the divorce action. Id. at 1028 (" 'A pleading may state
as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party .. .. ' No application was made for
intervention ... and the counterclaim was completely beyond the scope of the pleadings in the
divorce action." (quoting NEv. R. Civ. P. 13(b))).
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New Jersey, 226 New York,22 7 Tennessee2 2 8 and Texas,229 have allowed joinder
of tort claims to divorce actions, but have not expressly ruled it compulsory.
230
Although joinder is not compulsory in these states, res judicata may still bar a
subsequent suit in tort if the issue is raised during the prior divorce
proceeding.
231
a. claim preclusion as a bar to subsequent tort actions
In Kemp v. Kemp 232 a Tennessee Court of Appeals barred a battered wo-
man's tort action brought after the final divorce decree.2 33 The divorce court
ordered the husband to pay the woman's past and future medical bills incurred
from injuries suffered at his hand.23 a Even though the court admitted the two
actions were not the same, the court stated that by recovering an award of her
medical expenses she "in effect ... prevailed on a tort claim.,
23 5
The court's reasoning is directly opposite of the rationale used by the courts
in states that forbid joinder of tort and divorce claims.2 3 6 As the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court has pointed out, the award of alimony as maintenance and
support is not the same as the redress of a civil wrong.23 7 There is no reason
that spouses should not be held to the same level of conduct as the rest of soci-
ety.2 3 8 However, the Kemp court found that the wrong was redressed in the
award of future medical expenses and the wife did not have a separate tort
226. Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (only torts arising
after divorce may be tried separately).
227. Maharam v. Maharam, 575 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. Div. 1991) (tort for transmission
of venereal disease joined with divorce action).
228. Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tenn. 1987) (probate court hearing divorce
action had jurisdiction to award tort damages in divorce proceeding). Although the court did
not expressly state that all tort actions must be joined to divorce proceedings for injuries aris-
ing out of a marriage, the court implied this when it said "principles of res judicata apply not
only to issues actually raised and finally adjudicated in prior litigation, but to 'all claims and
issues which were relevant and which could reasonably have been litigated in a prior action.'"
Id. at 150 (quoting American Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Clark, 586 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tenn.
1979)).
229. Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (personal injury
action properly joined to divorce action). "A party may state as many separate claims as he or
she has regardless of consistency and whether they are based on legal or equitable grounds or
both." Id.
230. Kroning, supra note 171, at 93.
231. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
232. 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
233. Id. at 139.
234. Id. at 140.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 168-86.
237. Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909, 912 (N.H. 1988).
238. See Lilly & George, supra note 37, at 27 (Under large judgment against husband for
abusing wife, "spouses will be held to the same level of responsibility to one another as are
members of society in general.").
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action.2
39
In an Alabama case, the signing of a divorce settlement agreement was held
to bar a subsequent tort action by a wife against her husband.24° Because there
were words in the agreement stating that the agreement was in "full settlement
of all claims between the parties," the court held that it was the wife's intent to
waive her tort claims in addition to the settlement of the divorce. 241 Even
though states may allow tort actions to be brought after divorce proceedings are
over, the issues raised during the divorce proceeding, or the wording of a settle-
ment agreement could bar future tort recovery.
b. new jersey: compulsory joinder and its exception
New Jersey's "entire controversy" doctrine requires joinder of both tort and
divorce claims in a single action.2 42 If the tort happened during marriage, the
money damages would affect the outcome of the divorce proceedings. There-
fore, the parties should litigate both claims together.24 3
In Brown v. Brown 244 the New Jersey court considered whether a tort aris-
ing during a divorce action must be joined to the existing divorce action.2 4 In
Brown the couple had already separated and were in the process of dissolution at
the time the husband attacked his wife.2 4 6 His attack aggravated her existing
muscular dystrophy and caused her chronic cervical strain.2 4 7 As a result, she
required hospital care, extended treatment and therapy. 248 The New Jersey
court held that the tort did not have to be joined to the dissolution case.
249
The court found that if the tort occurred before the divorce action was
instituted, it must be brought with the divorce action. 250 If the tort occurred
after termination of the marriage, then it may be brought as a separate claim.
251
Because this action was brought during the pendency of divorce, the court chose
to look to the facts of the case and implied that the wife would be prejudiced by
adherence to the rigid rule of joinder.252 The court considered due process,
problems of practice and pleading and judicial administration to find that the
239. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d at 140.
240. Jackson v. Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (Ala. 1984).
241. Id. at 1291-92.
242. Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29, 32 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986) ("The entire contro-
versy doctrine ... is a preclusionary principle intended to prevent the fractionalization of
litigation by requiring all claims between the same parties arising out of or relating to the same
transactional circumstances to be joined in a single action.").
243. See id.
244. 506 A.2d 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
245. Id. at 30.
246. Id. at 31.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 34.
250. Id. at 33.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 35.
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new tort claims would conflict with the entire controversy doctrine.25 3 There-
fore, under Brown, while a tort claim must be joined to a divorce claim, there
will be an exception if the tort arises during pendency of the divorce proceedings
and requiring joinder would prejudice the plaintiff.
254
IV. INTERSPOUSAL TORT CAUSES OF ACTION
It was thought that the demise of interspousal tort immunity would open
the floodgates of litigation and fraud as unhappy couples took their differences
to court.25 5 This has not happened25 6 and some plaintiffs are receiving compen-
sation for wrongs committed by their spouses during marriage.25 7 For example,
courts now recognize the tortious infliction of venereal disease25 8 and have al-
lowed recovery for the transmission of AIDS between spouses.25 9
Unfortunately, tort law still fails to provide adequate remedies for battered
women abused by their spouses or domestic partners. Battered women pursue
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery
with little success. 2 ° One case asked the court to recognize a new tort of
spousal abuse.261 In two successful tort actions, the plaintiffs received substan-
tial awards after presenting testimony explaining the Battered Woman Syn-
drome.262 This evidence demonstrated the severe psychological damage victims
of domestic violence suffer.
A. Assault and Battery
Most interspousal tort cases are brought by battered spouses,263 and three-
253. Id. at 33.
254. See id. The court found significant the fact that the wife's divorce attorney had told
her he would not pursue the tort action for her. Id. In fact the attorney would not even
engage in research to decide in which jurisdiction the tort claim should properly be brought-
the one where the tort occurred or where the divorce action was pending. Id.
255. See, e.g., Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546 (Or. 1978).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 545.
258. See, eg., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984);
R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206
(N.C. 1920).
259. Silva v. Silva Estate, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1181 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1989) (wife awarded
$2.1 million against husband's estate because husband transmitted AIDS to wife).
260. See infra notes 263-419 and accompanying text.
261. de la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501
(D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. Aug. 14, 1989).
262. Gladish v. Simmons, 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1323 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Spotlight,
supra note 42, at 314 (Curtis v. Curtis).
263. Robert G. Spector, Marital and Custodial Torts, in MARITAL ToRTs, supra note 171,
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fourths of these cases are based on assault 264 and battery.265 Following the ab-
rogation of interspousal tort immunity, the courts worried about having to dis-
tinguish between two types of battery between married persons: a "purely
technical battery and normal hurts of intimate living;" and one of "gross abuse
of normal privilege.",266  There would be liability for the latter, but not the
former based on the theory of consent. 267 "[Niot every act that is tortious be-
tween strangers will be so regarded when ... between spouses" based on the past
conduct of the spouses and general social habits of the day.2 68
This "past conduct" theory gave rise to the defense of consent.269 If a hus-
band hit his wife in the past, she obviously consented to such behavior and can-
not complain now. The defense of consent has never been recognized as valid in
interspousal battery cases.2 7 0 In fact,'the main issues on appeal in interspousal
battery cases have been claim preclusion27 and statute of limitations.2 72 Bat-
tered women are undercompensated for their injuries because of these two
doctrines.
1. Damages for mental injury
In addition to damages for physical injury, juries may award damages for
emotional harm in assault and battery actions.273 Therefore, theoretically, a
battered woman should be able to fully recover monetary damages for all mental
injuries resulting from abuse under existing tort law through assault and battery
actions. When awarding damages for mental or emotional harm, the focus is the
woman's mind-her mental injuries. Battered women are undercompensated in
assault and battery actions because judges and juries misunderstand their mental
injuries.
274
After the initial outburst of violence, a battered woman's pattern of behav-
ior changes.2 75 A battered woman may be systematically beaten over a period of
264. Assault is "apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with [a] person." KEETON
et al., supra note 1, § 10, at 43.
265. Battery is "[a] harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act in-
tended to cause the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that
such a contact is imminent." Id. § 9, at 39.
266. See Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (Mass. 1976) (conduct not tortious because of
"marital concessions"; court mindful of "rights and privileges" in marriage); Beudett v. Frana,
173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Minn. 1969) (spouses "assume risk").
267. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 122, at 909.
268. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d at 532.
269. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 122, at 909.
270. Spector, supra note 263, at 3.
271. Id. at 4; see supra notes 164-254 and accompanying text.
272. Spector, supra note 263, at 4; see infra notes 301-39 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Criss v. Criss, 356 S.E.2d 620, 622 (W. Va. 1987) (elements of emotional
distress included in damages awards for assault and battery).
274. See, for example, Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978), where the court found no
cumulative effect from continued assaults and batteries. Id. at 548.
275. See generally id. at 42-54 (discussing learned helplessness).
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several years;2 76 with each assault a woman's fear of the batterer increases.27 7
Each battering incident compounds a woman's mental injuries-every time the
batterer beats his victim, he is beating a person who is already injured, thereby
exacerbating those injuries.2 78 It is this cumulative effect that judges and juries
fail to recognize.
a. cumulative effect of repeated beatings
Judges and juries may empathize with the battered woman if there is evi-
dence of the cumulative effect of systematic abuse. This was the flaw in the
plaintiff's argument in Davis v. Bostick.2 79 In Davis the plaintiff alleged the de-
fendant "'engaged in an intentional course of conduct designed to inflict emo-
tional stress and mental anguish.' ,280 The court rejected the plaintiff's
arguments and held each individual act separately actionable. 2 81 The court
noted there was insufficient evidence of a cumulative effect separate from the
"discrete elements of [defendant's] conduct." 28 2 She could not recover for the
cumulative effect when her evidence was the harm caused by "each act in the
series.")283 However, the court did not end its discussion there. The court went
on to imply that there could never be a cumulative effect from a continuous
course of assaults and batteries 284 and complained that the plaintiff was trying to
avoid the policy of the statute of limitations.285
The court said that conduct could have a cumulative effect when threats
276. See id. (battered woman scolded by court for waiting three years and two months to
seek legal recourse); see also Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314 (Curtis v. Curtis, No. 14514
(Idaho Dist. Ct. May 18, 1990) (unreported case) (plaintiff beaten for nine years)).
277. This fear is manifested in Walker's "tension phase." See WALKER, supra note 3, at 56-
59; supra note 84. Women will alter their behavior in anticipation of another beating, hoping
to prevent it from recurring. Unfortunately, this does not happen.
278. Repetitive beatings produce learned helplessness over time. Id. at 45.
279. 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978).
280. Id. at 545 (quoting plaintiff's allegations). The court stated there were 10 separate
incidents; some were individual acts and some were "groups of substantially identical acts
committed at different times." Id. This case is distinguishable from other battered woman
cases because the abuse did not begin until after the parties separated. Id. The legal argu-
ments, however, would be the same in a situation where the beatings occurred prior to
separation.
281. Id. at 548.
282. Id. at 547.
283. Id. at 548.
284. See id. at 547-48 (saying closest analogy is trespass and nuisance; court could imagine
cumulative effect when suicide results but not in this case).
285. Id. at 548. "The policy of the statute of limitations is to put at legal rest old claims."
Id. Even though the court said the question of whether or not the actions were continuous
could be left to the jury, it refused to do so in this case. Id. The court was disturbed by the
fact that if the jury were left to decide, then it would be able to consider all relevant evidence,
regardless of its remoteness in time. Id. However, the court recounted only 10 separate inci-
dents alleged over a three-year and two-month period. Id. It seems unlikely that the evidence
would be so remote in time that it could not be accurate. Even though bruises may be healed,
medical records would provide reliable evidence of injuries sustained no matter how "remote."
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and accusations culminate in suicide.286 However, the court did not see a con-
nection between the type of harm suffered by the abused woman and the suicide
victim. Yet, some battered women do commit suicide as a result of the cumula-
tive effects of the Battered Woman Syndrome.287 There are similarities: both
battered women and the victims of threats and accusations who commit suicide
suffer from mental injury inflicted by another. With each new act the mental
injury worsens and the victim suffers from the cumulative effect. In suicide
cases, the mental injury is caused by the continual threat and accusations culmi-
nating in suicide. Each threat and accusation may be separately actionable, but
their cumulative effect is the suicide of the victim. For battered women, the
mental injury is caused by periodic beating and continual threats or feelings of
threat culminating in the psychological disorder known as the Battered Woman
Syndrome.288 Each beating is separately actionable, but the cumulative effect is
the Syndrome, or inability to change the situation.
b. preexisting conditions offsetting damages
Under traditional tort law, the tortfeasor takes his or her victim as he finds
him or her.289 Like the person with the "eggshell skull,' 290 a woman should be
able to recover fully because the batterer beat an injured woman with preexisting
mental injuries.
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Catlett v. Catlett2 91 found a woman's
preexisting condition did allow for mitigation of damages when she sued her
husband in tort.292 The plaintiff in Catlett brought suit against her ex-husband
for injuries inflicted during their marriage.29 3 The plaintiff was awarded
$10,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages.294 The de-
fendant-ex-husband appealed and asked that the damages be stricken because he
believed the jury found justification.295 He based his argument on the fact that
286. Id.
287. WALKER, supra note 3, at 72 ("The resulting psychological terror creates a stress reac-
tion which produces all kinds of physical and psychological problems, including suicide.").
288. See supra note 84.
289. Hoffman v. Schafer, 815 P.2d 971, 972 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (certiorari granted by
Colorado Supreme Court, Sept. 9, 1991); see also KEETO N et al., supra note 2, § 43, at 296 ("if
the consequences themselves were foreseeable... not necessary to foresee the manner in which
they were brought about").
290. Hegyes v. Unjian Enter., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1144, 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 110 (1991)
(purpose of eggshell skull theory to increase incentive to reduce accidents). The eggshell skull
theory has been used mainly in negligence cases where the plaintiff's injuries were unforesee-
able because of some preexisting condition. See id. However, battered woman cases usually
involve intentional torts, more egregious than negligence cases.
291. 388 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
292. Id. at 15-16.
293. She brought assault, battery and false imprisonment claims against him for hitting her
and preventing her from leaving his apartment; for preventing her from leaving his car; and for
dragging her down a stairway by her hair. Id. at 15.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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the jury did not award the plaintiff all medical expenses she sought.296 In re-
jecting his argument, the court said the jury could have reduced the amount of
damages because of the plaintiff's preexisting back problem.
297
In Catlett the court did not discuss mental injuries, but it set a dangerous
precedent. If Mr. Catlett can have the amount of damages he pays reduced
because his wife had a preexisting back problem, he can also have his damages
for mental injury mitigated by the fact that she suffered from Battered Woman
Syndrome inflicted from his prior beatings. If Mrs. Catlett is barred from assert-
ing a cause of action for all the beatings resulting in the Battered Woman Syn-
drome, she will be under-compensated. In this case, the evidence of the
Syndrome would be twisted to be used against the victim.
Like the person who hits the stranger with the eggshell skull, a batterer
should be held liable for all damages caused by his intentional abuse. The latter
case is much more egregious because Mr. Catlett probably beat his wife with full
knowledge of her preexisting back problem. 298 This act is more culpable than if
the defendant acted with no knowledge of such conditions.2 99 It follows that a
batterer knows of the preexisting mental condition of a battered woman because
it was his prior beatings that produced it.30
°
2. Statute of limitations
Statutes of limitations are a major hurdle encountered by battered women
who try to recover for injuries inflicted during a brutal relationship. Courts have
refused to toll the statute of limitations for torts occurring during the mar-
296. Id.
297. Id. at 15-16. The court also stated that the plaintiff had been in an auto accident after
the alleged incidents but before trial. Id. at 15. The court did not elaborate on why this would
reduce the damages of plaintiff's intentional torts. See id.
298. One would assume that a husband would know of his wife's back problems.
299. One who intends to harm another bears greater responsibility than one who inadver-
tently causes harm. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 8, at 37. The rules are more liberal for the
consequences, requirements of proof and damages permitted. Id.
300. Men batter women because they want to hit them. FORTUNE & HORMANN, supra
note 89, at 59. Many batterers will try to minimize their culpability by blaming external fac-
tors such as stress or alcohol, id., and may try to claim they did not know that their battering
had cumulative effects. However, experts agree that these external factors are not the cause of
the violence, only excuses. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 54, at 3.
There are some cultures in the world that drink much more than we do but yet aren't
violent. So it is a cultural problem. We want to look at the oncoming bad economic
times... the poor men being out of jobs and all the stress that that will create and,
therefore, they will beat their wives.
Stress isn't the problem; it is something beyond that. It is culturally how we're
brought up as men, that we can go home and we can beat our wives; they are our
property and we can act violently, and until we examine that and avoid jumping to
snap conclusions that alcohol is the problem or stress is the problem, we're not going
to get anything done.
Id. (quoting Hearing Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, June
17-18, 1980, at 220 (testimony of Stover Clark)). It is clear that men beat women with the
intent to cause harm.
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riage.30 1 Therefore, while a batterd woman will be able to recover for injuries
suffered from the battering incidents occurring before the period of limitations
runs out, she will be barred from recovering for all her mental and physical
injuries suffered during the relationship.
The statute of limitations should be tolled during marriage for interspousal
torts. Interspousal torts are not typical because they are committed against a
person not likely to sue. The statutes do not account for this. The first time a
man beats his wife,30 2 she may believe it is an isolated incident. Even after the
second, third or fourth battering, a woman may still believe the batterer can
change his behavior or she can change him.30 3 By the time a battered woman
realizes the futility of her situation and brings suit, the limitations period will
have tolled for all but the recent beatings. If a woman cannot be compensated
for the physical and emotional injuries suffered from the acts falling outside the
limitations period, there is a causation problem created: which acts caused
which harm and how are the damages allocated?
a. allocation of damages problem
If a court will not permit recovery for a battered woman's cumulative
mental injuries in actions for assault and battery, there is the problem of allocat-
ing damages among the various assault and batteries. For instance, in Catlett v.
Catlett 304 the court reasoned that the jury could have reduced the damages be-
cause of the plaintiff's preexisting condition.30 5 How does the jury decide what
part of a battered woman's injuries were inflicted by the successive beatings?
The first time a batterer beats his victim, she suffers mental injury. The
second time he beats her, he is beating a person already injured. There are inju-
ries inflicted from both incidents. If the plaintiff is barred from suing for the first
301. See, eg., R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
302. Statistics show that most batterers do not beat their wives before marriage. BROWNE,
supra note 8, at 47 (73% to 85% do not experience physical abuse until after marriage). In
cohabitation cases the battering does not begin until the parties have made a major
commitment.
303. A battered woman may believe there is nothing she can do to help herself. Angela
Browne gives the following account from her personal interviews of battered women:
Another woman told of leaving after the initial assault and staying at a friend's
home where the man was unable to find her. However, her husband kept calling her
family and threatening them. Her parents were frightened, and finally her sister per-
suaded her to go home "for the good of the whole family." Women also talked to
clergy who told them the abuse was a cross they must bear and advised them to be
better wives; of marriage counselors who searched for what the women had done to
provoke their husbands and assured them that the violence would not have occurred
without some contribution on their part; and of attorneys who told them the assaults
sounded too minor to really be worth a court case, and advised them to see their
ministers or a marriage counselor instead. Such responses play into the women's
tendencies to minimize the seriousness of the violence and to blame themselves for
their partners' behavior, and decrease the likelihood that the first assault will be the
last. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 54.
304. 388 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
305. Id. at 15-16.
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battery by the statute of limitations, the jury must try to allocate the mental
injury between the two batteries. Because the batterer created the allocation
problem, he has the burden of proving how much mental harm resulted from the
second battering.
Nevertheless some harms are by their nature incapable of division. Mental
injury is one of these. To apportion mental injury would be "purely arbi-
trary.",306 Therefore the defendant should be liable for all mental injuries from
both beatings. However, as is seen in Catlett, the jury was allowed to reduce the
damages because of the plaintiff's preexisting condition.
30 7
To resolve this issue, the statute of limitations should be tolled during the
entire period of spousal abuse on the theory that spousal abuse is a continuing
course of conduct.308 Spousal abuse is not the "'usual personal injury case
[where] the defendant's wrongful conduct ceases on a certain day insofar as it
may be considered a cause of the injury in question.'... But in a continuing tort
case, the cause of action is not complete and does not accrue until the tortious
acts have ceased.",30 9 Unfortunately, the theory of continuing tort in spousal
abuse cases has had limited success.
310
b. continuing course of conduct
At least one court has ruled that the statute of limitations will be tolled
when a husband's repeated acts over the course of a thirteen-year marriage re-
sulted in the intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the plaintiff-
wife.311 In Twyman v. Twyman 312 the plaintiff recovered $15,000 in damages
under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress313 based on the
husband's behavior throughout the marriage.314 The plaintiff-wife included a
tort claim in her divorce action.315 She alleged that she suffered mental and
emotional harm from her husband's attempts to coerce her into performing acts
of sexual bondage throughout their marriage. 3 16 This coercive behavior began
306. See KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 52, at 347.
307. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d at 15.
308. See, e.g., Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
309. Id. (quoting Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
310. See infra notes 311-419 and accompanying text.
311. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d at 821.
312. 790 S.W.2d 819.
313. Id.
In order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a complainant must
show "the tortfeasor acted knowingly or with conscious indifference, causing a rela-
tively high degree of mental pain and distress, such as mental sensation of pain re-
sulting from such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment, indignation,
wounded pride, shame, despair, or public humiliation."
Id. at 822 (quoting Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 819 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988)).
314. Id. at 821.
315. Id. at 819-20.
316. Id.
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five years after they were married when he asked her to participate in deviant
sexual acts.317 She refused because she had been violently raped before mar-
riage.3 18 However, the husband continued to seek bondage with other women,
frequently visited stores selling bondage paraphernalia and brought bondage
magazines home.3 19 The plaintiff lost thirty pounds, sought treatment from
three counselors, sustained physical injury when she agreed to try to participate
in the acts with her husband and experienced "despair, devastation and humilia-
tion" in addition to fear of contracting AIDS or a venereal disease.320 The court
found this enough to support her claim of mental anguish.
32 1
Her husband argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it applied the
theory of continuing tort to her claims.322 The court defined a continuing tort
as "'one inflicted over a period of time... [involving] wrongful conduct that is
repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action.' ,323 In
applying the concept of a continuing tort to the case, the court held "the cause
of action is not complete and does not accrue until the tortious acts have
ceased.",324 The conduct causing the plaintiff's mental distress-the husband's
continual insistence that his wife engage in deviant acts-was not held to be a
series of intentional acts each with its own statute of limitations.3 25
It is unclear how far the Texas Third District Court of Appeals is willing to
extend its concept of continuing tort because of limiting language in its opinion.
Its definition of a continuing tort appears to be limited by the court's comment
that "'usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can
"fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm .... 326
Therefore, the questions arise: first, what is significant harm and second, if each
battering incident in a continuous pattern of spousal abuse produced "significant
harm," would the plaintiff be denied recovery under a continuing tort theory?
The questions may have been answered in Twyman by the court itself. The
plaintiff in that case did receive significant physical injuries when she attempted
to engage in bondage activities with her husband.32 7 Although this could be
considered significant harm in itself, the court did find it part of a continuous
course of conduct.328 Additionally and significantly, the court focused on the
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. The plaintiff was also distressed by the fact that her 10 year-old son discovered the
bondage magazines. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 822.
322. Id. at 821.
323. Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 177, at 231 (1987)).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 822.
326. Id. at 821 (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quot-
ing Fowkes v. Pennsylvania R.R., 264 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1959))) (emphasis added).
327. Id. at 820. The plaintiff testified that after one encounter she bled for four days and
sought treatment from a gynecologist. Id.
328. Id. at 821.
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"emotional coercion" aspect of the plaintiff's injuries. 3 2 9
The court in Twyman further distinguished "usual personal injury case[s]
[in which] the defendant's... conduct ceases on a certain day." 330 The court
did not indicate whether the concept of continuing tort would only be applied to
mental injuries because mental injuries are "different" from ordinary batter-
ies.33 1 Even if recovery would not be allowed under a theory of battery for all
physical injuries suffered during a violent marriage, the court's ruling is clear
that a battered woman would be able to recover for all mental injuries3 3 2 result-
ing from the cycle of violence, under a theory of continuous course of conduct
leading to the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
c. continuous nature of mental injuries of battered women
Once a woman is beaten by the person she lives with 333 she may become
fearful: he is capable of doing it again. The battering incident may be kept alive
by the batterer through threats, body movements or body language. Threats to
harm the victim and the victim's family with guns, knives and other weapons are
common.33 4 Social isolation and humiliation are used in conjunction with the
threat of violence to control women in battering relationships.335 In effect the
batterer keeps the battering incident alive in order to control the behavior of the
victim.
3 3 6
Battered women begin living under severe psychological stress337 and may
exhibit a variety of symptoms ranging from sleeplessness to heart palpita-
tions. 338 Battered women start to feel powerless in their situation and begin to
exhibit the same characteristics of victims who are repeatedly traumatized over
short periods of time.3 3 9 The effects do not dissipate over time, but are exacer-
bated with each new beating.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Loss of voluntary control or learned helplessness prevent women from changing their
situation. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 42-54, for a description of her theory of learned
helplessness in battered women.
333. Battering often occurs in couples who do not live together. For example, teenage bat-
tering has been of increasing concern.
334. WALKER, supra note 3, at 75.
335. Id. at 166.
336. See id. at 71-77, 166.
337. Id. at 61.
338. Id. Walker also lists "loss of appetite, or... overeating, oversleeping, and constant
fatigue.... Many women suffer from severe tension headaches, stomach ailments, high blood
pressure, allergic skin reactions, and heart palpitation." Id.
339. Id. at 49. Walker likens the battered woman's situation to people in concentration
camps. Id. Their behavior is contrasted to victims of a single traumatic disaster, who usually
overcome the effects in time. Id.
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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Because of the serious nature of the mental injuries suffered by battered
women, a few women have sued their batterers for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."4 Although rarely used in domestic tort cases, it may have the
greatest application in redressing battered women's mental injuries.
3 4 1
One drawback to an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of ac-
tion is the short statute of limitations.342 Because of this, some plaintiffs have
argued for a "continuous" tort of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.3 43 Another drawback is that many of the decisions recognizing emo-
tional distress have relied on acts of assault and battery to prove the outrageous-
ness of the conduct and relegated the emotional distress to parasitic-type
damages.3 44 All eases discussed previously have dealt with a few specific in-
stances of violence in the marital relationship. Two cases have tried to argue for
a continuing tort occurring during the entire abusive relationship in order to
recover for the full extent of both the physical and psychological injuries suf-
fered during that relationship. 3 5 The cases that follow are the attempts by wo-
men who suffered from the Battered Woman Syndrome.
1. Unsuccessful cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress
a. Oregon: no intentional infliction of emotional distress in assault and
battery actions
In Davis v. Bostick 3 46 the plaintiff brought a cause of action for an " 'inten-
tional course of conduct designed to inflict emotional stress and mental
anguish.' ,347 The court, however, saw the case as a series of intentional torts,
assaults, batteries, etc., each with its own statute of limitations which started
running at the time of the specific act.34 8 Even though the court found that the
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, the plaintiff was denied dam-
ages because the statute of limitations had expired for each and every individual
battery.3 49 It appears that the court treated intentional infliction of emotional
distress as parasitic to each battery action and not as an independent cause of
340. See, eg., Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 547 (Or. 1978).
341. Robert E. Driscoll, Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress, in MARITAL
ToRTs, supra note 171, at 57. A prima facie case is established by allegations of(l) intentional
acts, (2) of extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) proximately causing, (4) severe emotional
distress. Id. Several recent cases have shown the courts' willingness to recognize this tort in
the domestic relations context. See infra notes 420-31 and accompanying text.
342. Spector, supra note 263, at 11.
343. See, e.g., Davis, 580 P.2d 544.
344. See, e.g., id.; see KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 12, at 57.
345. Davis, 580 P.2d 544; Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
346. 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978).
347. Id. at 545 (quoting plaintiff).
348. Id. at 547. See supra notes 301-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
statute of limitations problem in this context.
349. Davis, 580 P.2d at 548.
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action. 350
The plaintiff alleged that each of the acts caused some harm, but she also
alleged that cumulatively they caused her mental suffering. 35 1 She alleged she
felt "harassed" and became "a nervous person." 352 The court agreed that the
defendant's behavior was "all of a piece in intent and content without substantial
letup for three years and with almost diabolical variety' 353 yet refused to allow
the plaintiff to recover for the psychological effect of the injuries.354 The court
declared that it could "well imagine" that a course of conduct could have an
identifiable effect, such as when threats and accusations cause suicide, but re-
fused to imagine an identifiable effect in this case.
3 55
The reasoning of this and other cases runs contrary to current tort law on
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Oregon Supreme Court in Davis
suggested that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is only par-
asitic to the assault and battery causes of action.356 However, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress has been recognized as an independent tort since the
1930s. 357 The tort has stood alone for conduct which would seem less extreme
and outrageous than a husband's continued physical and mental abuse of his
wife.3 58 Clearly the test in the early cases was not whether the mental suffering
was the result of another alleged tort such as battery, but whether the conduct in
itself would lead a person, upon hearing the facts, to exclaim "outrageous."
359
Yet, the Davis court proclaimed that the conduct was indeed intentionally con-
tinuous and outrageous, but did not allow the action to stand. 3 °
b. New Mexico: husband's privilege and privacy paramount to wife's mental
injuries
In a recent New Mexico decision, Hakkila v. Hakkila,3 6' the wife counter-
350. See id. "Recovery for mental injury was permitted only if it could be shown that the
mental damages were 'parasitic' to another already recognized tort." Driscoll, supra note 341,
at 57.
351. Davis, 580 P.2d at 547.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 548.
355. Id. (citing Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960)).
356. Id. at 547.
357. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 11, at 60.
358. For example, the tort is recognized where an employee of a railroad or hotel (consid-
ered common carriers) insults a customer. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 Fed. Cas.
(C.C. Mass. 1823) (No. 2575). Other cases allowed the cause of action when a practical joke
led to physical and mental illness of the plaintiff, Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897), and
where the nature of the conduct was similar to extortion, Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814
(Minn. 1926) (girl coerced into signing immoral confession).
359. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 11, at 60 n.54 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46
cmt. g (Supp. 1948)).
360. Davis, 580 P.2d at 547.
361. 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 811 P.2d 575 (N.M. 1991).
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claimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress in response to her hus-
band's dissolution petition.362 Ms. Hakkila alleged a continuous course of
conduct throughout the marriage that included assault, batteries, insults,
demeaning remarks, locking the wife outside their home at night during winter,
refusal to have sexual relations and refusing to allow the wife to pursue school
and hobbies.363 The court held the husband's conduct was not sufficiently out-
rageous to support Ms. Hakkila's claim.364 Although the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is recognized in New Mexico, the court created a
higher burden of proof for claims by spouses.365
The court stated three reasons for limiting intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress in intramarital claims: "(1) preventing burdensome litigation of
the commonplace, (2) protecting privileged conduct and (3) avoiding groundless
allegations of causation .... ,366 The court premised its decision with a discus-
sion of policies for limiting the scope of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress: privilege and privacy of the accused.367 According to the court, Mr.
Hakkila had the "privilege" of inflicting emotional distress upon his wife.36 8
The court condoned the violent and unreasonable behavior by men toward their
wives. For example, the court matter-of-factly stated: "Courts must recognize
we are not yet as civilized as we might wish. Many, if not all, of us need some
freedom to vent emotions in order to maintain our health.' ' 369 Apparently the
court feels it is permissible for Mr. Hakkila to maintain his mental health at the
expense of Ms. Hakkila's mental health. The court continued: "Intentionally
making another person unhappy or upset may also serve usefulpurposes besides
simply preserving the mental health of the perpetrator" and suggests that such
behavior may have a "greater social good. ' ,3 70 The scope of the tort may be
restricted because there may be a "protected liberty interest" in the conduct,
according to the court.
37 1
After concluding that conduct causing emotional distress may have social
utility (for the person causing the harm) and ignoring the victim's rights, the
court proceeded to apply its policies to the application of intentional infliction of
emotional distress between spouses.372 First the court recognized spousal abuse
is prevalent in our society and claimed it "unfortunate." 373 However, the court
362. Id. at 1321.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1327.
365. Id. at 1326.
366. Id. at 1325.
367. Id. at 1323-24.
368. Id. at 1324-25.
369. Id. at 1324 (emphasis added).
370. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. Rav. 42, 57 (1982)).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1324-26.
373. Id. at 1324.
April 1992] 1059
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
chose to construe the tort of outrage "loosely" because it feared taxing judicial
resources. 3 74 Finally, the court stated that outrageous conduct between spouses
is "likely to be privileged., 375 "Partners who are pledged to live together for a
lifetime have a right to criticize the other's behavior." 376 However, the court
does not distinguish Mr. Hakkila's conduct which included slamming a camper
shell on Ms. Hakkila's head and the trunk lid on her hands while she was put-
ting groceries into the camper.
377
The court equates Mr. Hakkila's behavior to a benign statement such as
"'you look awful'" or "'you look 'like a hippopotamus.' "371 Mr. Hakkila's
privacy interests were of paramount concern and Ms. Hakkila's mental injuries
were ignored.3 7 9 Ms. Hakkila's mental injuries were not even in question-she
was too "emotionally disabled" to even attend the hearing.380 Yet the court
thought nothing of her rights. Instead, the court distinguished intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims against a spouse from other interspousal torts,
such as automobile accidents, finding the accused in an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress needs more protection from public exposure:
Although the spouse who raises a claim of outrage has no right to com-
plain of the exposure of matters relevant to the claim, courts must be
sensitive to the privacy interests of the defending spouse. Any litigation
of a claim is certain to require exposure of the intimacies of married
life. This feature of the tort distinguishes it from intramarital torts
already recognized in New Mexico.
381
The court said that Mr. Hakkila's refusal to have sexual relations with his
wife was too intimate a matter for inquiry and that the trial court judge based
his opinion on this fact for finding outrage. 382 However, the court ignores the
other facts: assaults, batteries and other continuous conduct which cause actual
mental injury to Ms. Hakkila which was apparently serious enough to prevent
her from attending the hearing. 38 3 The court made no attempt to hide its sym-
pathy for Mr. Hakkila when it lamented: "[Mr. Hakkila] was subjected to a six-
day trial, to say nothing of discovery and other preparation, surveying the rights
and wrongs of a ten-year marriage., 384 The court worried only about protecting
Mr. Hakkila from public scrutiny and not at all about his abuse of his wife. In
fact, the court focused entirely on Mr. Hakkila, his needs, his privileges, his
374. Id. at 1324-25.
375. Id. at 1325.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1322.
378. Id. at 1325 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 illus. 13 (1965)).
379. See id. at 1321, 1325.
380. Id. at 1321.
381. Id. at 1325.
382. Id.
383. See id. at 1322, 1325.
384. Id. at 1327.
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privacy and his acts and not at all on the effects of Mr. Hakkila's behavior on
Ms. Hakkila. She was a nonentity in the eyes of this court.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals did not completely shut the door on
interspousal claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 85 It did,
however, make the standard of proof impossibly high for abused women to
meet.386 The court also gave a stern warning to intimidate possible plaintiffs in
the future: "Motions for summary judgment should be viewed sympathetically
in similar cases. If the potential harms from this kind of litigation are too fre-
quently realized, it may be necessary to reconsider husband's suggestion that the
tort of outrage be denied in the interspousal context.
'" 387
2. Disagreement over intentional infliction of emotional distress in divorce
actions in Texas
Battered women have been more successful in Texas than in most other
states when suing for intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 88 In Massey v.
Massey 389 and Twyman v. Twyman, 390 courts of appeal let stand jury verdicts in
favor of the abused plaintiffs. However, the appellate court reversed a $500,000
award to a woman in a decision which effectively created an exception to the
abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in Texas. 391 Apparently the court
thought it was against public policy to allow spouses to seek damages for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
392
In Chiles v. Chiles 393 a jury awarded the plaintiff-wife $500,000 in damages
for intentional infliction of mental distress. 394 The claim had been brought as a
second cause of action in a divorce proceeding tried to a jury.395 The defendant
had frequently used drugs and alcohol, physically and verbally abused the plain-
tiff and had relationships with women he met at topless bars.396 The appellate
court reversed the jury award, holding that policy considerations "militate
against the introduction of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress"
385. "There is no need at this time to adopt husband's recommendation that all such claims
be barred." Id. at 1327.
386. Id. at 1326.
387. Id. at 1327.
388. See, e.g., Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ($362,000 jury
award); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (writ granted Dec. 19,
1990) ($15,000 jury award; negligent infliction of emotional distress). But see Chiles v. Chiles,
779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) ($500,000 judgment overturned on appeal).
389. 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
390. 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (writ granted Dec. 19, 1990).
391. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127.
392. See infra notes 391-404 and accompanying text.
393. 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
394. Id. at 127-28.
395. Id. at 128. Texas allows some aspects of divorce proceedings to be tried to the jury.
Id.
396. In re Chiles, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1190 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1988), rev'd, Chiles v.
Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
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in marital disputes.3 97
The court believed that to allow separate damages for intentional infliction
of emotional distress in a divorce proceeding would result in the "evils" avoided
by the abrogation of fault divorce.398 However, the court did not elaborate on
these evils. It did state the tort action would "obfuscate" the other issues in the
divorce proceeding--custody, support and division of community property.
3 99
The rationale used by the court was that the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress must be accompanied by physical injury. 400 Based on this
premise and the fact Ms. Chiles did not allege any specific physical injuries, the
court concluded that "negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical
symptoms, leads us to the conclusion that the tort should not be recognized in a
divorce action."
4 ° 1
Based on its thin rationale, the court was actually creating an exception to
the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in Texas.4 2 The decision was se-
verely criticized by the Third District Court of Appeals of Texas in Twyman v.
Twvman. 403 The Twyman court held that the issue of interspousal tort immu-
nity for all causes of action had previously been decided by the Texas Supreme
Court in the case of Price v. Price. 4 The court went on to say that Chiles was
wrongly decided under Price when it carved out an exception to the abrogation
of interspousal tort immunity. 4" There was no reason to make any exceptions
from the abolition of interspousal tort immunity because the policy arguments of
"marital harmony and the potential for collusive lawsuits provide no support for
resurrecting interspousal immunity.
',40 6
The First District Court of Appeals of Texas, in Massey v. Massey,4° 7 also
disagreed with the Chiles decision.4°8 In Massey the jury awarded the plaintiff-
wife $362,000 for emotional distress damages."° 9 The parties were divorced af-
ter a twenty-two year marriage. Ms. Massey filed a tort claim with the divorce
397. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d at 131-32.
398. Id. at 131.
399. Id. at 132.
400. Id. at 131.
401. Id. The court referred to negligent infliction of emotional distress even though the
plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
402. This was clearly contrary to Price v. Price, the case in which the Texas Supreme Court
had abrogated the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987); see
Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 397 (Texas law does not require physical injury for tort of infliction of
emotional distress; to require physical injury only in family law cases is denial of equal protec-
tion); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (issue of interspousal
tort immunity firmly settled in Texas; Chiles court erroneously applied law on interspousal tort
immunity) (writ granted Dec. 19, 1990).
403. 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (writ granted Dec. 19, 1990).
404. Id. at 821 (citing Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987)).
405. Id. at 823.
406. Id.
407. 807 S.W.2d 391 (rex. Ct. App. 1991).
408. Id. at 396.
409. Id. at 395.
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action and at trial alleged her husband was "abusive, explosive, and rageful.
' 4 10
Even though he was a bank president and had personal assets worth over
$3,000,000, he would not let Ms. Massey control any finances.4 1 1 He would give
her only $20 at a time for groceries and he would buy her clothes for her.4 12 He
threatened to leave her penniless if she divorced him and never allowed her to
even write a check.413 He even admitted he used threats to "get his way" in his
marriage.4 14
Ms. Massey's psychologist testified at trial that Ms. Massey was "emotion-
ally battered. ' 4 15 Although the court never indicated the psychiatrist diagnosed
Ms. Massey as suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome, many of the charac-
teristics used to describe Ms. Massey are those of a battered woman.416 The
psychologist described Ms. Massey as
paralyzed, passive, and intimidated.... [Ms. Massey] was extremely
fearful and had learned to deal with Henry through avoidance, "walk-
ing on egg shells" so as not to trigger Henry's rage. The psychologist
characterized much of Henry's behavior as stemming from a malicious
intent to harm [Ms. Massey]. She predicted that [Ms. Massey] would
need extensive psychotherapy in the future.4 17
The court found the evidence of Henry's conduct sufficiently "outrageous" to
support the emotional distress claim.4 18
The courts' reasoning in Massey and Twyman furthers the public policy of
providing plaintiffs "redress for wrongs committed against them." 4 19 It should
make no difference that the parties were married at the time the tortious acts
occurred; the public policy of promoting domestic tranquility cannot be
410. Id. at 399.
He constantly engaged in verbal abuse such as criticism and blaming, and he belittled
her in front of their children. He had temper tantrums and physical outbursts which
sometimes involved the destruction of property. Although he stopped short of physi-
cally assaulting her, [Ms. Massey] testified that Henry's physical outbursts caused
her to experience intense anxiety and fear.
Id.
411. Id. at 403.
412. Id. He became enraged once when she bought two $75 dresses on her own. Id.
413. Id. She wrote a check, once, in an emergency. He "exploded" and forbade her from
entering the bank where he worked. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 400.
416. See id.
417. Id. All of the characteristics used by Ms. Massey's psychologist similar to those used
by Dr. Lenore Walker to describe women suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. See
generally WALKER, supra note 3.
418. Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 400. "Outrageous conduct is that conduct which exceeds all
reasonable bounds of decency." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTs, § 46 cmt. g
(Supp. 1948)). "[It] is a fact for a jury to decide." Id.
419. Id. at 396 (quoting St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653-54 (Tex.
1987)).
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achieved when one of the parties is terrorizing the other.42 ° To follow the Chiles
decision and allow interspousal tort immunity to continue to be applied to di-
vorcing couples would be "denying equal protection to a person because of their
status as partners in a marriage relationship.,
421
3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed where expert testimony
used
One of the first tort cases to introduce expert testimony on the Battered
Woman Syndrome was Gladish v. Simmons.42 2 The plaintiff-wife sued her hus-
band for "psychological battery" suffered over their six and one-half year mar-
riage.423 The wife alleged that the defendant "tossed cups of coffee at her,
destroyed furniture and household items during fits of rage, struck her, and
threw her to the floor because she tried to intervene when he was spanking his
son, and insulted her in front of her friends." 424 She also testified to suffering
several physical ailments caused by his behavior, including "depression, severe
headaches, acute stomach pains, and substantial weight loss."'42 5 No cause of
action for specific acts of battery was alleged and no issue regarding the statute
of limitations arose during trial.4 26 Apparently, the court considered this tort a
single, ongoing cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
rather than a "battery" as alleged in the complaint.4 27 The jury, in a message to
the defendant and the community that such "outrageous conduct will not be
tolerated," awarded the wife $100,000 in punitive damages.
428
The most recent cas6 allowing damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, Curtis v. Curtis,429 used expert testimony on the Battered Wo-
man Syndrome to show the intentional infliction of emotional distress was
suffered as a result of the abusive behavior over the course of the entire relation-
ship.430 The court considered the intentional infliction of emotional distress and
the battery as separate causes of action.43 1 Thus, even though only three batter-
ies were alleged in the complaint, the court allowed testimony of incidents over
the entire relationship to prove the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
43 2
420. See id. at 396-97 (promotion of marital harmony illusory); Twyman v. Twyman, 790
S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (marital harmony already destroyed).
421. Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 397 (quoting Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1987));
see also Twyman, 790 S.W.2d at 823 (also citing Price).
422. 11 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1323 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. See id.
427. Id. (case proceeded on theory of psychological battery).
428. Id. ($15,000 damages also awarded for remedial therapy).
429. Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314.
430. Id.
431. See id.
432. The statute of limitations issue apparently was never raised by the defense. See id.
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These two cases appear to be a victory for battered women in the fight to
have their injuries from prolonged abusive relationships redressed. It should be
noted, however, that both cases used expert testimony on the Battered Woman
Syndrome. The attorneys for Sandra Curtis Firth believe this was a major factor
in the award of damages.
4 33
V. A NEW TORT OF SPOUSAL ABUSE
In one District of Columbia case, the battered spouse asked the court to
recognize a new tort of spousal abuse. The court refused to recognize it. In de
la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette 434 the parties filed for divorce
in 1986, and the divorce was finalized in 1987.435 The following year the wife
filed a tort action against her ex-husband alleging intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, assault, battery and spousal abuse.43 6 She alleged he had com-
mitted various acts of assault and battery during the marriage, including sexual
assault on their daughter, which caused her emotional distress.
437
The plaintiff explicitly asked the court to do what the plaintiff in Davis v.
Bostick 4 38 only implied: recognize a new tort of spousal abuse.4 39 The new tort
would treat "individual acts of violence as part of an ongoing pattern." 440 It
would include assaults, batteries and psychological abuse occurring during the
marriage. 44 1 The basic difference between the new tort and separate actions for
each and every act of abuse would be the tolling of the statute of limitations as
long as the spousal abuse continued." 2 The statute of limitations would begin
to run after the last incident and would expire after three years.443
The court rejected the new tort on the ground that there was no showing
that the new tort was needed to adequately address the claims.44 However, no
expert testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome was given. Expert testi-
mony may have demonstrated to the court the cumulative psychological effects
on the woman, and the court could have very well concluded that a new tort was
needed to give the plaintiff a chance to fully recover for all of her injuries suf-
fered from the beginning of the cycle of violence.
433. Id. Due to extenuating circumstances, Dr. Walker was available to testify only on the
first day of trial. The judge allowed her to testify as the plaintiff's first witness on the condition
the plaintiff lay the foundation later. The attorneys believe this helped the jury to understand
Sandra's testimony under cross-examination when she was asked why she did not leave Carl.
Id.
434. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1989).
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1501-02.
437. Id. at 1502-03.
438. 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978).
439. de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 1502.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
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The court also noted that the policy of finality in a divorce warranted the
exclusion of the new tort between spouses." 5 The court reasoned that "the deci-
sion whether to divorce or not should be made in an environment as free of
extraneous financial and fault considerations as possible." 44 6 This makes little
sense. The fact that a woman is being beaten by her husband should be a major
factor in her decision whether to divorce him. As far as financial considerations
are concerned, money is recognized as a major factor in a battered woman's
decision to stay married to a batterer. 4 7 She may not be able to afford to leave
him. Where she will go, who will pay for food and shelter, who will look after
the children if she must work-these are all considerations in her decision to
leave or stay. 448 The court's argument also overlooks another major factor in a
woman's decision not to leave-fear. 449 Battered women may "accurately per-
ceive the risks of remaining, accurately perceive the risks of leaving, and choose
to stay ... because the risks of leaving outweigh the risks of staying."
450
By leaving fault and economic considerations out of the divorce decision,
many women would be condemned to the terror of living with an abusive man
and the Battered Woman Syndrome. However, if a woman can recover for her
physical and emotional injuries suffered during her marriage, she will be more
likely to break out of the cycle of violence. 51 Likewise, the tortfeasor-husband
will be less likely to abuse his spouse because he knows it will cost him more
than the price of alimony if she decides to leave him and sue for personal
injuries.4 52
The courts' aversion to creating a new tort for spousal abuse is perplexing
at best. One reason given is that the wrongs can be adequately addressed under
existing tort laws.4 5 This reasoning fails for two reasons. First, because of the
short statute of limitations for intentional torts of assault and battery, a battered
woman cannot get redress for the full effects of the Battered Woman Syn-
drome.4 54 Second, courts are reluctant to recognize intentional infliction of
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See WALKER, supra note 2, at 36.
448. Id. at 130.
449. "Batterers reportedly would frighten their women with terrorizing descriptions of how
they would torture them. They often backed up these descriptions through the use of guns,
knives, and other weapons in their abusiveness." Id. at 75; see also Littleton, supra note 10, at
29 (battered women give four reasons for staying in battering relationships: fear, love, desire
for connection and absence of options).
450. Littleton, supra note 10, at 45-46. Littleton takes the argument one step further by
adding that battered women "are trying to rescue something beyond themselves." Id. at 46.
Littleton argues that these women still love their batterers and stay in order to try to help
them. See id. at 46-47.
451. See supra note 84 discussing the cycle of violence.
452. See Littleton, supra note 10, at 52-53 (calling for increase of perceived costs of bat-
tering behavior).
453. See, e.g., de la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA)
1501, 1502 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1989).
454. See supra notes 301-39 and accompanying text.
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emotional distress as a tort separate from assault and battery in the domestic
context.
4 55
It can be argued, however, that cases such as Gladish v. Simmons 45 6 and
Curtis v. Curtis,457 where the courts allowed recovery of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, show an emerging trend toward the recognition of the
problems faced by battered women and a willingness to let juries rectify the
situation with punitive damages in intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases. 45 8 However, Gladish and Curtis are only two isolated cases, and because
neither case was appealed there is no appellate authority for the trial courts to
follow. Moreover, the defendants in both cases apparently did not raise the stat-
ute of limitations issue. It is unclear what would have happened had the issue
been pursued. Appellate cases show a reluctance to let the intentional infliction
of emotional distress cause of action stand on its own without valid assault and
battery actions filed within the short statute of limitations period.4 59
Another reason given for disallowing recognition of the new tort is that it
would open up the floodgates of litigation.4 6° However, this was an argument
for maintaining the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity when it was
first attacked.4 61 Some courts have acknowledged that this has not happened.462
Some courts, when asked to recognize a new law that they do not like, may
"pass the buck" to the legislature for its creation.463 This is very hypocritical
considering that the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity was
created by judges to counteract the legislature's desire to give women their own
identity, through control of their property, when the Married Women's Acts
were first passed.46 It is also hypocritical in that judges have created a whole
plethora of laws, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress and the tortious infliction of venereal disease, an
interspousal tort recognized in many states.
4 65
VI. PROPOSED RESOLUTION
A. What the Courts Can Do
In order for battered women to be fully compensated for their physical and
455. See, e.g., Criss v. Criss, 356 S.E.2d 620, 622 (W. Va. 1987).
456. 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1323 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nor.
Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
457. Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314.
458. Gladish, 11 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) at 1323; Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314.
459. See supra notes 301-39.
460. See, e.g., de la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1501, 1502 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1989).
461. See, e.g., Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546 (Or. 1978).
462. See, e.g., Simmons, 773 P.2d at 604 (citing cases from New Jersey, Utah and Arizona).
463. Id.
464. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
465. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984);
Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920).
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mental injuries, courts should recognize the continuing tort of spousal abuse.
The elements would be similar to those impliedly asked for by the plaintiff in de
la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette:466 (1) intentional acts; (2) of
extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) of a continuous nature; (4) proximately
causing; (5) physical injury or emotional distress.467 The statute of limitations
would begin at the last incident of violence. The term spouse should not be
limited to married couples, but should be defined to include any partner in an
intimate, on-going domestic relationship, including a "spouse, former spouse,
cohabitant, former cohabitant or any adult person related as closely as a cousin
or any other person with whom the batterer has had a dating or engagement
relationship or against the parent of a minor child by the other parent."
468
Interspoual tort immunity should be completely abolished in all actions. It
is a common law doctrine created for the purpose of preventing women from
being treated equally under the law.46 9 In jurisdictions where the immunity has
been abolished, courts should not try to create exceptions for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress actions.470 The immunity was completely abolished in
Texas and New Mexico, yet courts in both states created exceptions to prevent
battered women from recovering for their mental injuries inflicted by abusive
husbands.
47 1
The courts should not bar interspousal tort claims on the ground of res
judicata because the parties had previously been involved in a divorce proceed-
ing. Women should not be barred from recovery for personal injuries suffered
because they received an equitable divorce settlement, to which they would have
been entitled regardless of the injuries received. Tort actions are to redress a
wrong and every member of society should be held to the same standards
whether or not the parties are married. The Second Division Court of Appeals
in Arizona put it most succinctly when it said: "'Whether a man has laid open
his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out her eye, broken her arm, or poisoned
her body, he is no longer exempt from liability to her .... We have progressed
that far in civilization and justice.' ,472
466. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501, 1501-02 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1989).
467. Id. at 1502.
468. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 540 (West 1987) (from definition of domestic violence). The
definition should be broad enough to protect all people in intimate relationships from abuse, as
does the California domestic violence law. Id.
469. See Price v. Price, 320 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1987) ("To leave in place a bar to...
suits involving non-vehicular torts would amount to a repudiation of the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection under the laws.").
470. See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 811
P.2d 575 (N.M. 1991); Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
471. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320; Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127.
472. Windauer v. O'Connor, 477 P.2d 561, 564 (Ariz. 1970) (quoting Bogen v. Bogen, 12
S.E.2d 649, 651 (N.C. 1941)), vacated, 485 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. 1971).
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1. Legal reasoning
The courts acknowledge the Battered Woman Syndrome as validly recog-
nized by science and permit expert testimony about it to be used to either reduce
or justify the charge of murder.473 Battered Woman Syndrome is characterized
by a continuous cycle of violence that needs to be broken. With this in mind,
there should be little question of the Battered Woman Syndrome's validity in
proving why the tort of spousal abuse is a continuous act intended to inflict
injury upon the victim. It should be welcomed by the courts as a way of ad-
dressing the victim's needs and making her financially independent so she may
break out of the cycle of violence.4 74
Further, the courts should not focus entirely on the perpetrator's rights in
domestic abuse cases.475 The court in Hakkila concerned itself more with pro-
tecting the abuser's rights than addressing his victim's injuries.4 7 6 Nor should
the courts make the standard of outrageous conduct so high that no battered
woman could ever meet it.477 Men who batter women should be held to the
same levels of reasonable conduct as the rest of society.
The recognition of the new tort would solve the growing controversy over
the statute of limitations in these cases. Presently, it is up to judicial whim to
decide whether the acts were continuous or not.478 Additionally, there is the
uneven application of laws involving the use of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress in tort cases between spouses. For example, in the state of Texas,
the districts disagree as to whether interspousal tort immunity still exists in ac-
tions for intentional infliction of emotional distress between spouses.
4 7 9
2. Policy
There are many reasons why the courts should want to advance the new
tort. The first is to deter violence. Domestic violence statistics are staggering
and are grossly underreported.480 If battery is the single largest cause of injury
to women, as the Surgeon General has stated, by deterring domestic violence we
can not only protect women, but save enormous economic costs.
4 8 1
By allowing women to be compensated for their injuries, they will better be
able to obtain economic independence. Economic necessity is a frequently cited
473. See supra notes 223-44 and accompanying text.
474. See Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
475. See Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320.
476. See id. at 1325. The Hakkila court did say that Mr. Hakkila would not be as pro-
tected if he committed a "battery," yet Mr. Hakkila did commit several batteries on his wife.
The court ignored this. See id.
477. See 1d.
478. Compare Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (continuing tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress) with Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978)
(continuing tort disallowed).
479. See supra notes 386-419 and accompanying text.
480. GOOLKASIAN, supra note 5, at 2.
481. See supra note 3.
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factor in the reasons why battered women do not leave their batterers 48 2 Statis-
tics show Battered Woman Syndrome is not found in just impoverished fami-
lies.483 There are a great many wealthy men who beat women, like Mr. Curtis
or Mr. Massey,484 who can afford to compensate the victims of their abuse.
Poor women have an even greater incentive for seeking redress in the civil
rather than the criminal courts. If the man is the primary breadwinner, which is
often the case in abusive relationships, it will not help an economically depen-
dent woman to have him put in jail.485 She and her children need him to be a
working and a fully functioning member of society. The goal should be to keep
such men out of jail unless absolutely necessary. There are a growing number of
domestic violence diversion programs and treatment available for men who bat-
ter women.486 If the consequences to men who batter women involve economic
as well as criminal sanctions, there will be even more incentive for men who
batter to seek treatment and stop altogether.
Courts should stop accepting domestic violence as inevitable. As long as
men know they will not be held accountable by the laws and the judiciary, they
will continue their violent behavior. Women deserve to be respected enough to
have the protection of law. The Hakkila court suggested that domestic violence
is inevitable because "we are not yet as civilized as we might wish" and went so
far as to state that inflicting mental distress is mentally healthy for the perpetra-
tor and "may also serve [other] useful purposes." 487 This view should not be
tolerated. The Hakkila court trivialized Mr. Hakkila's actions, comparing them
to "family romping. ' 488 Mr. Hakkila's romps included throwing his wife across
the room and her face into a pot of dirt; slamming a camper shell on his wife's
head and the trunk on her hands; refusing to allow his wife to pursue school and
hobbies; going into rages and screaming at his wife, among others.
4 89
It is time for courts to stop protecting men who batter. It is time to address
the intolerable conditions under which many women live. 490 The courts need to
stop treating spousal abuse victims as the problem and start placing the blame
with those who perpetrate random and uncontrolled violence toward women.491
482. GOOLKASIAN, supra note 5, at 7.
483. WALKER, supra note 3, at 34.
484. See supra notes 420-31 and accompanying text.
485. Littleton, supra note 10, at 54.
486. CALIFORNIA A'rTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 21, at 128.
487. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 811 P.2d
575 (N.M. 1991).
488. Id. at 1323.
489. Id. at 1322. The court did not believe that Mr. Hakkila would go into rages and
scream at his wife when they were home alone because he did it only one time in front of
witnesses. Id. at 1322. Why does the court not believe Ms. Hakkila?
490. Littleton, supra note 10, at 42.
491. Id.
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B. Legislatures
Legislatures can amend their domestic violence laws to include the recovery
of civil damages for abuse suffered during a marriage, cohabitation or other dat-
ing relationship. Most states have already made domestic violence a crime, how-
ever, this does not compensate the victim of the crime with monetary judgments
for injuries suffered which may be extensive and long lasting. Women should
have the ability to seek compensation for wrongs committed against them by
domestic partners and hold those partners to the same standards under the civil
law as the rest of society.
Legislatures should not sit back and wait for courts to change the laws to
accommodate the needs of women. Action is needed to make the law more
equitable. First, legislatures should explicitly repeal any vestiges of interspousal
tort immunity. Second, legislatures should give women the option ofjoining tort
claims with divorce actions. They should not make joinder mandatory as many
women do not know their rights or may be too frightened of their batterers to
bring a tort action until after their marriage has been dissolved. Third, legisla-
tures should not let divorce settlements preclude tort actions. Many women
may not be savvy enough to understand that settlement agreements could pre-
vent further recovery or may not be able to afford an attorney during dissolution
proceedings. Fourth, legislatures should codify a new tort of spousal abuse.
C. What Attorneys Can Do
Attorneys who handle divorce or tort litigation between spouses should fa-
miliarize themselves with the warning signs of domestic abuse.492 Many women
are either afraid or embarrassed to admit they have been victimized by a loved
one's abuse as is highlighted in both the Curtis and Chiles cases.493 In both of
those cases, it was the attorneys who realized that these women had suffered
from more than a dysfunctional marriage.
494
Furthermore, attorneys can develop new strategies in the pursuit of tort
cases in which women have been battered. The attorneys in Curtis partially
attribute their success to the fact that the first witness on the stand was their
expert witness, Dr. Lenore Walker.495 Even though this was not planned, they
believe it helped the jury understand the plaintiff's cross-examination and why
the plaintiff did not simply walk out of the relationship, even before the plaintiff
took the stand. This way, it did not seem to the jury that excuses were being
made after cross-examination.
492. Many sources are available. For example, see KUEHL et al., supra note 7, ch.2 and
LEFCOURT, supra note 3.
493. Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314
(Curtis v. Curtis).
494. Lilly & George, supra note 37, at 26-27 (Chiles v. Chiles); Spotlight, supra note 42, at
314 (Curtis v. Curtis).
495. Spotlight, supra note 42, at 314.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Women have achieved tremendous gains in having their wrongs redressed
by the legal system in the last century. Women were finally recognized as legal
entities in the eyes of the court, although in limited situations in the late 1800s
with the passage of the Married Women's Acts. In the 1970s women were fi-
nally able to sue their spouses for certain injuries suffered during the marriage.
By 1990 most states had recognized the pervasiveness of domestic abuse in our
society, most of which is directed at women. Even though the law has come a
long way in the last one hundred years, women still are not able to fully litigate
the wrongs committed against them in the civil courts and be compensated for
all injuries resulting from those wrongs. The recognition of spousal abuse as a
tort would help to achieve equality in holding every member of society to the
same standards of care and making available compensation for the violation of
those standards.
I cannot say that I think you very generous to the Ladies, for whilst you
are proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating all Nations,
you insist upon retaining an absolute power over Wives. But you must
remember that Arbitrary power is like most other things which are very
hard, very liable to be broken-and notwithstanding all your wise Laws
and Maxims we have it in our power not only to free ourselves but to
subdue our Masters, and without violence throw both your natural and
legal authority at our feet ....
Rhonda L. Kohler
496. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (May 7, 1776), reprinted in LEVIN, supra
note 1, at 84.
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